

SARAH HORSEY-BARR

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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[Note: This interview was not edited by Ms. Horsey-Barr]

Q: Today is the March 15, 2000, the Ides of March. This is an interview with Sarah Horsey-Barr. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Sarah, let's start at the beginning. When and where were you born?

HORSEY-BARR: That's definitely the beginning. June 8, 1948, here in Bethesda, Maryland.

Q: Tell us something about your family.

HORSEY-BARR: My immediate family is a Foreign Service family. In fact, six weeks after I was born I went off to my first post as a dependent in Rome, and I've been overseas for lo these fifty years. My father, Outerbridge Horsey II, who is deceased now, had been in the Foreign Service for some 30 or 35 years.

Q: He was a major name, great name.

HORSEY-BARR: Well, he was one of those names that people always talk about when they're talking about the Foreign Service, one of those unusual names that characterize....

Q: His name was mentioned just, I think, last week with somebody. It comes up again and again, particularly on the Personnel side.

HORSEY-BARR: That's interesting, because I didn't know if he had worked in Administration or Personnel.

Q: He was doing something getting people assigned.

HORSEY-BARR: Well, he had a very interesting career. In those days, if you remember, people often went to the same country on successive occasions - this was before Kissinger's GLOP policy - and his place was Italy. His first post was Naples back in 1944 - no, it would have been earlier than that actually, because the second post, I think, he was in Budapest and he was evacuated from there during the war. So it would have been very early, late '30s, very early '40s. But anyway he had four assignments in Italy, each of which was for four years, so he became quite an Italian expert, if you will, and personally loved the country.

Q: He and Homer Byington...

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, they were good friends - Homer Byington III, the IV.

Q: This was the Third. There were three that were consuls general in Naples, a grandfather, a son and a grandson, and he was the grandson.

HORSEY-BARR: I remember visiting them, but I never kept all their enumerations straight in my mind. He spent a lot of time in Italy. He spent a lot of time focused on Europe, and, of course, the United States being such a Eurocentric country even today and certainly at that point just before and during and after the war, that was, I guess, in the view of many the place to be if you were interested in foreign policy.

Q: What was his background?

HORSEY-BARR: He was one of seven children- seven to five; I'd have count them - of a Maryland family. His father was a lawyer who moved to New York because there was no money to be had, no income, if you will, around Washington/Baltimore back in those days in the late 19th century. So he moved to New York, his father, so he grew up there. His father died when he was very young. Our family is a Catholic family, and my grandparents' view, as I heard it, was that if you wanted to give a good Catholic education in those days - we're talking turn of the century to 1910; my father was born in 1910 - you had to send your children overseas to a good Catholic school. So the family, which wasn't rich - they were living on my grandfather's earnings as a lawyer in New York - the kids all went to Catholic schools in England. My father first left home when he was eight years old. I remember seeing his passport application. I started out in the Passport Office, and I saw his passport application, a little tyke of eight years old, and there he was going off to boarding school in England. All his brothers and sisters did the same in various schools. Most of them were not in the same school, but they were all either Catholic nuns or priests or whatever. Then the parents, and my grandmother after my grandfather died, would go over for vacations there. They'd take a house in the south of France or the south of England. You know, the English vacations are very different from ours; they have a month at Christmas and a month at Easter and then just two months in the summer, so it's more sort of balanced than American school vacations. So that was the only time that the kids, after they were about seven, eight, nine years old, spent time with their family, with their siblings and their parents, during these vacations, as I said, either in the south of France or the south of England. I guess it is a pretty odd sort of upbringing for a child. After he did that, he went to - let me see; was it Oxford or Cambridge? I think, Cambridge - so he studied at Cambridge and did the equivalent of an undergraduate there and then came back to this country and went to MIT and studied to be an engineer and in fact graduated and started working.

Q: I suspect he went to Cambridge because Cambridge was more scientifically inclined than Oxford.HORSEY-BARR: You may well be right. I've never been to either in my travels and so it's just never been fixed, but you may well be right. Anyway, then he came back here and he did study to be an engineer at MIT and graduated and then actually started working in New York as an engineer but was very bored and decided that he would try and join the Foreign Service. So at that point I gather that he was kind of in a quandary because he hadn't spent much time in this country. I remember him telling me he decided that he would take a year and go traveling around this country picking up odd jobs and whatever to get to know the country because he was sure when he came before the board of examiners that this would be a natural question: "You're a foreigner. Why do you want to be in the U.S. Foreign Service?" So he did that. Anyway, he was ultimately successful in passing the exam and loved it. Never did I hear any regret, and he was rather successful, I think.

Q: Where did he meet your mother?

HORSEY-BARR: That's an interesting story too. They're actually distant relatives. The Horsey and Lee families historically, at least the Maryland branches of both, are related through both the Lees and the Carrolls of Maryland and such, so he and my mother were fourth cousins. They probably met as children, but their first real getting to know each other, as I hear the story, was when he was sent back from, I think, the second assignment in Budapest with TB. He got TB there, so he was sent back and the Department medical people, I guess, said, "Take a year and recover from your TB." So he went off to the country, and they were adjoining farms out near Frederick, Maryland, and so she was sent over to entertain her distant cousin and one thing led to another. That was probably in the '40s, early '40s sometime.

Q: Had your mother gone to college?

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, she grew up in the country there near Frederick, didn't go to school, was tutored at home. They used to spend half the year in Frederick in the summer. My grandfather on that side had been actually a Foreign Service type himself. He had been a political appointee and was head of legation in Honduras and in Guatemala and then down in Peru but as a political, but this was much earlier in his life. At this point he was sort of the manager of this property, this family property there near Frederick. Then in the winters, for some reason that's still not clear to me, they would go to Atlantic City. She never went to school until she went to college, and then she went to college up in Westchester County in New York, Manhattanville College, a nice, good Catholic college. I think her degree was in library science, and then she worked in Baltimore - she had grown up in Baltimore, the latter years anyway - I think for the diocese, the Catholic diocese. Then she worked for the OSS during the war down at the Navy complex, offices with apartments, down in those offices. She has some interesting stories about Wild Bill Donovan. Then she didn't work as so many women, so many Foreign Service women in those days, after she got married.

Q: You were in Bethesda, you were born in '48, and then you went rather quickly...

HORSEY-BARR: Six weeks later we went to Rome, where my father was political counselor. My first language ended up, because of that, being Italian. We stayed there that time four years and then came back to Washington. We lived out on the Apientita, if you know Rome. Nobody in their right mind would live out there now; traffic has just gotten so awful. But that was the first of I'd say a total of about 15 or 16 years that I lived in Italy between one place and another.

Q: You would have been four years old when you came back. Then you were in Washington for how long?

HORSEY-BARR: Maybe three or four years.

Q: So we're moving into the years where you're getting educated.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes. I went to school here. We lived up off Massachusetts Avenue near the Cathedral. Went to a nice little convent school there. When we left Washington, we went to Japan.

Q: This would be around...

HORSEY-BARR: This is always difficult figuring out the dates.

Q: 1956 or '57.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, about '56, because then about '60 or '59 - I think it's '59 - we went to Rome again. So we spent, say, three years, I guess, in Tokyo.

Q: What was life like in Tokyo for you?

HORSEY-BARR: That was our first exposure to the Sacred Heart nuns, which we then sort of stuck with all through our education, it seemed, all of us. They made for a very pleasant academic environment and such, and they had an international school there, which, as I remember, was very pleasant, maybe half Japanese and half whatever of different nationalities, but the classes were all in English. We had a very nice house, which is still the DCM's house in Rome. The house was on a bit of a hill. I haven't been back to Japan, so I don't know what it's like now, but it seems in reflection that Tokyo was made up of small villages and the small villages made up the larger city. Maybe they were just neighborhoods. We would go down with the maids to the various village festivities, which were Japanese, Buddhist. Who knows what they were in retrospect, but they were always a lot of fun. We were very well accepted by the Japanese that were attending these festivities. I remember Tokyo as being very crowded. I remember a number of trips that we took. My father was a golfer, and so we would go on these short vacations to different places around Japan, all of which had golf courses and were very pleasant. Like so many places, I hate to go back for fear of ruining the memory.

Q: I think you're right.

HORSEY-BARR: I'm sure it's gotten very congested. I'm sure it's pleasant for people who go there now, but for somebody that brings the whole baggage of childhood memories and all that....

The ambassador, I remember, was Douglas MacArthur and Wahwee.

Q: Did you ever hear any Wahwee stories?

HORSEY-BARR: Oh, no, I can't remember any, but my mother's got a lot of those, I'm sure. A lot of people have, as well as Douglas MacArthur stories. I'm not sure that he was, from what I gather, terribly beloved as a person, though he may have been very effective.

Q: People say he could be very effective but he was not a warm person. [Inaudible.]

HORSEY-BARR: Did you? He's deceased now, isn't he?

Q: Yes, he is.

HORSEY-BARR: I think Wahwee...

Q: She died before he did.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, that's right, because I remember seeing him at a cocktail party and she had died. Well, they were nice to me, is all I can say. I don't think they did this with all children, but he/they gave me this collection of glass animals. I don't know how long our period of overlap was, so I don't know what the occasions were on which I was presented with these various animals, but I ended up with a whole lot of them and they all came from the MacArthurs. My brothers and sisters did not get these, and I cannot remember why it was that somehow I struck favor with one or the other or both. I was pretty young in Japan, so it's hard to remember very much about that.

Q: Then you went from Japan back to Rome?

HORSEY-BARR: We went from Japan back to Rome.

Q: This would be about '59.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, this is about '59.

Q: And you were there, you say, four years?

HORSEY-BARR: Four years. Well, I was there six years actually, but my father was there four years, because from there he went on to Prague as ambassador and there were no schools.

Q: He was DCM in Rome?

HORSEY-BARR: He was DCM in Rome, yes.

Q: What was schooling like in Rome? Back to the sisters again?

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, the same Sacred Heart sisters, who probably still are an international order, French based, but have schools all over the place. Yes, they had a number of schools. They had two in Rome, one of which was for poorer, less advantaged children over near the Vatican, and the one we went to was attached to that church, the Trinita dei Monti that you see at the top of the Spanish steppes. That's their church, and the school was attached there. As I said, they were French nuns, so you spoke French outside the classroom and Italian in the classroom, because it was run according to Italian state curriculum. It was very traditional, some might say monastic. In reflection at the time I didn't mind it, but thinking back on it, it does seem rather monastic and barbaric.

Q: One hears so many stories of the nuns, you know, with rulers and...

HORSEY-BARR: They didn't deal with the rulers, but they had funny ideas on things. All your mail was screened, incoming and outgoing, except, I think, to parents. If you were a boarder, as I was the last two years, you weren't allowed to leave unless your parents had given permission and specified whom you could leave with. We were lucky. My younger sister was with me the first year that I was a boarder, and I think we were going to the dentist to get braces or whatever, so my father had arranged things, which I'm sure you couldn't do today, having an embassy car pick us up on Wednesday afternoons, because there were no classes, to take us to the dentist. So we got out once a week, but otherwise you never left the place. You were there morning to night. You woke up at 5:30.

Q: So much for boys.

HORSEY-BARR: On, no boys. Boys were out of the question. I do remember being called on the carpet because some boy in Prague was writing to me, another embassy kid, and, oh gosh, this was worse than death. But it was pleasant. It was a supportive atmosphere at the time. I could not go back to it obviously. If I had kids, I'm not sure I'd put my own kids in that situation. But they were nice nuns. The kids were all Italian except for my younger sister and me. We were the only foreigners there. We went in the first year not speaking any Italian, because we'd lost it all, and that was difficult. But the Italians are a very nice people, and it was a very pleasant atmosphere. It was a very different academic upbringing than what we get here in the States, not so great in sciences or math, but great on the linguistics and history and that sort of thing.

Q: Did they train you sort of in - I may be a little off on this - the Cartesian method of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, this very logical approach.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, that was part of it. As an example of that, you had to get up in front of the class and kind of be drilled by the teacher on whatever the lesson was, and then all the students would take their time drilling you as well. They were not paid but they had different roles that they were supposed to play in terms of this thesis that you mentioned. So you really had to learn how to think and look at things from a different perspective. They were very heavy on the classics, which I think is essential for a founding in education. I don't know that kids take much in the way of Latin and Greek these days.

Q: They don't even read the Bible anymore.

HORSEY-BARR: Right. Even now, you come across a word you don't know, and if you think back to your Latin and Greek, it's just immensely valuable. So there was a lot of emphasis on that. There was obviously a lot of emphasis on religion, getting up at 5:30 in the morning and then go to mass. And that provided interesting experiences too, because the Vatican II Council happened while we were there. You know me: I always wanted to get out of something that's longer and do it in a quicker way. I thought I would volunteer to say mass for one of the cardinals. A lot of them were staying in the hotel next door, which was nice, the Hassler Hotel. It's a nice one there in Rome. If you said mass for one of the cardinals or bishops, you could get in and out. They just whipped through that mass, and you'd get out in 20 minutes and could go and have your breakfast, whereas otherwise if you did the regular mass, it would take 40 or 45 minutes, so that was kind of nice, which is an interesting commentary on the Catholic Church today. It's only now that you read in the newspaper about girls, women, being allowed to serve mass in an open setting, but when it's convenient the Catholic Church will make do, but back in the '60s...

Q: Particularly at the cardinal level.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, they didn't find it was any problem to having a girl saying mass. That's what they could get. It just goes to show that even though the Catholic Church is often, and often rightly, accused of being so rigid, they can bend when it suits their interests. I was there three years as a day student and then two years as a boarder.

Q: Did you get to Prague at all when your father was there?

HORSEY-BARR: For vacations.

Q: What was your impression of Prague? This would be in the '60s. It was not a happy place.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, this was in the early '60s. It was not a happy place. Relations were very tense between us, the United States, and the Czech government. My father, as I said earlier, used to play golf, and there were a number of nice golf courses in the vicinity, within a couple hours' drive from Prague, and so we would go and I would always caddy for him. So he and I would go off together and such. The favorite sort of ploy would be, of course, whenever there was a spat between the two countries, to put the golf courses off limits. Well, he was the only one that played, so the official retribution ended up being a rather personal one in that sense. Yes, things were rather tense at the time. We were teenagers at that point, but we weren't allowed to go around by ourselves very much because of the fear that something could happen, and there was an awful lot of checking in and "Where are you going?" and "When you get there, call me," and all this sort of stuff, which had not been the case when we were in Rome, because Rome was a pretty safe city in terms of personal safety. There was a lot of ugliness in Prague in terms of the construction of buildings, but it was the same as you were seeing all over Eastern Europe. Actually we went to Havana in February and, interestingly enough, you see the same sort of gray concrete buildings there that you see in Eastern Europe. Stores were bare. There wasn't anything to buy. It was very cold, not very much in the way of heating, and what heating there was was produced by brown coal, which I guess in the years since has been the source of the forests dying out. What do they call it?

Q: Acid rain.

HORSEY-BARR: Acid rain, exactly, and the whole problems that we hear about in terms of the Black Forest and others. I can remember my parents, if they needed to have a serious conversation, regardless, I think, whether it was about official stuff or family stuff, would walk outside in the garden. While we were there, a microphone was discovered in one of the logs in my father's office, which I think DS still has on exhibit. I saw it one time. It's somewhere around the Department. So there was always sort of that not fear but the bothersome nature of somebody knowing that the servants in the house were reporting. As children it didn't bother us too much, except that it did penetrate because the family structure, the family modus operandi, was different, because I guess my parents would be looking for that kind of thing. Let me think what else about Prague. We used to ride the trams. There wasn't much traffic there. That was another interesting thing. If you're coming up and you want to make a left turn, you just make a left turn, just sort of pull out in the intersection and go left in this country. At the time there was so little vehicular traffic in Prague that in order to turn left what people would do was swing to the right and put themselves at the head of the oncoming flow of traffic, wait till the light changed for that particular flow of traffic, and then go. I doubt they'd be doing that, but there were all kinds of very strange things like that that were going on that spoke to the backwardness of the society, not the culture, because it has a very fine culture and Czechoslovakia was always very steeped in culture. The house we lived in, the house which is still the residence, was one of three owned by a family called Pechek, who were very wealthy industrialists, as I understand it, had their own railroad and used their own railroad and railroad cars to escape when the Nazis were coming in and ended up in upper New York. But the three residences - one is the Soviet, Russian now, one the Chinese, and one the US - are all built in the shape of a crescent, and they're all built fairly much along the same plan, and the gardens are all the same plan and such, by various members of this family, which is kind of an interesting story. They were beautiful. Ours, I think, was the nicest, as I heard it, the United States' one.

Q: Was your family, your father, at all worried about you - and I'm speaking of you in the plural - not getting sort of an American education?

HORSEY-BARR: No, I don't think that bothered him. It don't think it bothered him because he hadn't gotten an American education, and I don't think it bothered my mother because she'd been home schooled until she went to college, so they didn't look at it the way perhaps most Americans would have. Now, it did get to be a problem, and the reason I only stayed two years as a boarder was at that point I could hardly speak English and I would write home in Italian. There were four kids and the pattern was different for each of us. My oldest sister had gone to French school, French language school, and she had already come back to the States to a boarding school to sort of take the exams for college, and my parents decided that I should come back for junior year in high school because I couldn't speak English anymore, or write it for that matter. So this was - let's see; I graduated in '66.

Q: Where'd you go?

HORSEY-BARR: I went to another Sacred Heart school north of Philadelphia, same nuns, just north of Philadelphia, a place called Eden Hall, which is since defunct, and I spent two years there as a boarder and would go to my mother's sister for vacations, except for the summer when I would go back to Prague still. And that was all right. I did well there. I didn't like it. It seemed as though all the other kids were either foreigners, from Central or Latin America, or came from broken homes of one sort or another. It's just not that much an American tradition, I guess, to do the boarding school routine. But anyway, everything passes, and I finished there in '66 and went to Georgetown that fall.

Q: You must have been in one of the first groups of girls to go there, weren't you?

HORSEY-BARR: At Georgetown?

Q: Yes.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, there weren't very many in my class. Again, the whole university/college system here is so different from Europe. I didn't know much about it, and I didn't know that there were probably an infinite number of things one could do as an adult, nor did I realize that there was an infinite number, a large number, of colleges, universities, technical schools or whatever. I didn't have any idea what the options were. My father had been to Georgetown for a semester or two, so I knew about that. In the Foreign Service we spent most of our time socially with non-embassy people whose parents didn't really figure in the equation of the children, if you will. So the only thing I knew that adults did was to be in the Foreign Service. So I have Georgetown because my father went there for a couple semesters, and my oldest sister went to the same college my mother had been to, Manhattanville in Westchester County, and I had zero knowledge of anything else, so I applied to the two of them for this program - I don't know if they still do it - early admission, where you get admitted in your junior year in high school and then you commit to them and then you can essentially put the whole thing behind you. So I did that, and they came back and said, "Fine," and so I said, "All right, I'll go to Georgetown, Georgetown Foreign Service School" and put it out of my mind and went on and enjoyed everyday life. It's hard to say looking back would you do it over again. It's been a great life, but I can't say that I had this passion that was going to be satisfied.

Q: This was just the way the world was.

HORSEY-BARR: That's the way the world was.

Q: Of course, in the Foreign Service Georgetown is the name that one thinks of so often because of their various prep facilities and the School of Foreign Service and all. So many people have gone through it, maybe just for a few months or for years.

HORSEY-BARR: Right, but, you know, my class, my undergraduate class, which was foreign service, only one other person came into the Foreign Service, and he's still here. He and I actually came into the Foreign Service in the same class as well, which I thought was strange. All the rest went on to be lawyers or some were bankers and some did things that were just not related to the Foreign Service at all, international relations at all.

Q: You were there '66 to '70, I guess.

HORSEY-BARR: At Georgetown, yes.

Q: This must have been a very interesting period, the Vietnam thing...

HORSEY-BARR: Vietnam thing, yes.

Q: In '66, how did Georgetown strike you? Was it considerably different and freer than having been sort of under the rules of the nuns?

HORSEY-BARR: Than under the rules of the nuns, yes, obviously it was. The first year I was there I lived on campus in a dorm, and it was definitely much freer, rather unnerving given how confining, if you will, my background had been, and confining not just physically but culturally. That was a big shock. I didn't feel at all comfortable with my peers in terms of what was going on socially, and politically I didn't have a clue, and culturally I didn't have a clue what was going on. I really felt like a foreigner.

Q: One of the things was you were saying your schoolmates...

HORSEY-BARR: In Philadelphia.

Q: ...many were foreigners.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, a lot were rich kids, very wealthy kids from Central America and that sort of thing.

Q: That's not usual.

HORSEY-BARR: No, that doesn't have a great touch with reality. It was very strange, and I felt very much out of place at Georgetown. In terms of overseas exposure, what seemed normal to me, did not seem normal to my friends at Georgetown, and what seemed normal to them was just bizarre. I've talked with other Foreign Service brats about that, and it's something that I don't know that you can ever catch up on, if your adolescent years are in a foreign environment. That's not to say that going to an American school overseas is a foreign environment. That can be pretty much as good as being here in the States. But ours was not that at all. I don't know that you can ever kind of catch up, and even now my husband will say, "You're a foreigner. Why did they let you in the Foreign Service? You don't know who that is," that movie star or '50s song or '60s. It's one of those things that I don't know that you can ever catch up on. It's not really important in terms of the essence of life, but when you're young, when you're in your late teens or even early 20s, I think, it can be rather a jarring sort of experience. But Georgetown was still at that time very much a Catholic institution. I don't think it's that way...

Q: Today it's, I think, about 50 percent...

HORSEY-BARR: Right, and the atmosphere, I don't think, is that of a Catholic.

Q: And by reason of being in DC, they have a gay-lesbian association...

HORSEY-BARR: No, it's a very different place.

Q: and they have debates on abortion and non-abortion....

HORSEY-BARR: And there is this whole debate going on about Catholic institutions of higher learning and just what is the basic tenet that implies you can call yourself a Catholic institution versus just a general academic institution. I think Georgetown's kind of in the lead of that debate, not surprising with the Jesuits. But at the time, back in the early '60s, it was still very much of the Catholic flavor. Yes, you mentioned the Vietnam War. That was going on around and certainly Georgetown was very active. I remember participating in a number of demonstrations. Again, I think I was fairly naive politically, not that I probably would have felt differently about the war, but just the whole role of demonstrations and the political process and such was something that I didn't know very much about. My friends were very competitive academically, and I certainly was not. I think they were all very competitive, very challenged people to succeed, and they all have. So it's kind of interesting. We're a nucleus; we have about 10 who were focused on the Foreign Service and international relations and being abroad and such like that. Interestingly enough, we've stayed in close touch for the most part.

Q: How was it being a girl in an institution which was still not really - now I think it's more than 50 percent...?

HORSEY-BARR: Right, I think you're right. At the time there were very few of us. You know, Georgetown, again at the time - I don't know what it's like now - has various schools, the business school, the college for language, foreign service, whatever, and the schools were to a large extent separate and the female-male ratio was quite different in different ones in the school. For example, the nursing school was all women; foreign service was maybe a quarter women beginning with our class. I didn't really think about it, because I had always been in girls' schools, so it really wasn't an issue. I certainly hadn't been exposed to any debate about women's issues, having grown up overseas.

Q: This was the first time you were in a really American institution. Were you doing anything to get Americanized?

HORSEY-BARR: No, I was just trying to survive. I found the course work very difficult. I found the writing very difficult, writing in English. As you know, romance languages are just not different languages, as you probably know, but it's a whole cultural thing. An Italian or Spanish or French sentence will go on for five lines; an English sentence will probably go on for only one and a half lines. So it was a very different way of thinking, and I found that was difficult since I was used to what was not the accepted way. I didn't feel very comfortable there at all. I felt comfortable with my friends, but I didn't feel very comfortable with the institution because - I don't know why - there were just too many things that were just unknown or strange for a foreigner and it was a lot to cope with. Now, the first year, as I say, I lived on campus, which was really, as you pointed out, just being thrown into the milieu of this American environment. After that I did not live on campus. My parents were here. I don't know why I lived on campus, but I did that first year. But my parents were back here at that point. Anyway, I left for my junior year abroad, and I went back to Rome. I went to Loyola College, or University I guess it is, in Rome for junior year and then actually debated not going back. But, what the hell, one more year.

Q: How did you find going back to Italy after being away?

HORSEY-BARR: That's an interesting question, because that time going back to Italy at Loyola I was with a bunch of Americans. So I was with Americans in Italy as opposed to before being with Italians in Italy. It was nice to be able to share what I knew about the city and the culture and the people and such with friends there at Loyola. It was also nice to be there on my own, because my parents at that point were down in Sicily, they weren't in Rome. That was a very satisfying year. It was also nice to be able to look at cultural and artistic monuments as an adult, if you will, as opposed to being dragged around.

Q: Also, I imagine this would have allowed you to be more of a leader too. You knew the language, you'd been around the block, so people would look to you.

HORSEY-BARR: That's right, exactly, and it was very nice to be able to share it with them and to appreciate it myself as an adult as opposed to a child being dragged around. "Now it's Sunday, and this Sunday we'll do this church or this museum or whatever it was." That was a very satisfying year. I enjoyed that a lot, and I did a bit of traveling with friends around Italy and around Europe actually. It was nice, and then, what the hell, I had one year left so I came back and finished.

Q: On the Vietnam issue, were there a lot of debates? Was the campus pretty well stirred up?

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, but there weren't a lot of debates, as I remember. There was a lot of participation in demonstrations because, of course, Washington was a focus point for demonstrations and a lot of participation. There was a lot of discussion around the dorms and in small groups about the Vietnam business. I don't remember debates, like formal debates in the auditorium.

Q: At Georgetown there was no sort of taking over the classrooms or administration or anything like that?

HORSEY-BARR: No, no. You see, that's one of the things that I would still say back at that time it was very much a Catholic institution, and good Catholics in the old days used to do what they were told, follow the rules. It's very much sort of a dogmatic approach. And I think there was a large bit of that at least still left. I may be wrong, but I don't remember that kind of stuff going on.

Q: I would imagine that there was a series of big demonstrations and marches on Washington and all that, and Georgetown would have a lot of students from other places coming and you'd be putting them up and all that. Did you run into much of that?

HORSEY-BARR: I didn't. It may well have gone on, but in my group of friends I don't remember that. I do remember people used to play very hard at Georgetown, so while it was perhaps quite active in demonstrations, Vietnam and civil rights as well, people used to play really hard too. A lot of drinking went on.

Q: Today there is, and there has been for a long time, very serious concern about the drinking. Did you find this was a problem?

HORSEY-BARR: No, not in our group. I'd been drinking since I was 15. We always had wine. We had wine at Sunday lunch and we had wine in the evening. Again, that whole very American thing about drinking and you can do it when you're 18 or 21 was something again that was very strange to me. I remember parties, yes, and there was booze there and, yes, I can remember people getting drunk. I can't remember this obscene kind of drunkenness that you hear about today, not to say that perhaps it didn't happen, although I don't remember ever hearing about somebody dying from binge drinking as has been the case in the last four years. Yes, people got drunk and they probably got sick and they probably drove when they shouldn't have, but I think it was something of a different order than what we're seeing today.

Q: I think you're right, because even going back, much farther back, that wasn't a problem. People got drunk, but there wasn't this competitive thing to kill you.

HORSEY-BARR: Right. People got drunk but then you were dancing. I guess my theory, whether it's right or wrong, is that, well, if you're dancing and you're drinking, you drink and then you dance a while and you get some of it out of your system, I guess. I don't know what happens at these binge drunken parties.

Q: I think they begin playing competitive. How about the Foreign Service? You say not too many of your group went into it. Was there a problem? Was the Foreign Service still considered a good thing?

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, remember those were still the days - well, that was just after JFK actually, that was about three or four years after JFK got killed and I think there was still the spirit of patriotism and do something for your government. A number of the people that I was friendly with came from less advantaged, if you will, financially families where they were the first to go to college or what have you. I think, perhaps understandably, for them the motivation was more material, possessions, money, status, that sort of thing rather than the country. I think a number of the women, almost all of the women actually - except maybe two besides myself - ended up being mothers at home. That sort of frame of mind was still very much in evidence there. There wasn't any bad-mouthing anti-government in terms of a career. There would be anti-government in terms of the policies, Vietnam, civil rights, that sort of thing, but not in terms of government service. Government service was still seen as an honorable occupation. I can remember my friends just sort of foaming at the idea that my father was an ambassador and wanting to talk to him all the time. There was a lot of pride in that they knew him and that he talked to them, and I think that speaks to the way people looked at government service still in those days.

Q: How about your family? How did they feel about your going into the Foreign Service?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, I don't know. On the one hand my father was very traditional and probably had a fair amount of 'a woman's place is in the home' business. At the same time I think he was pleased that there was something in common. As people he had much more in common, if you will - they were more like kindred spirits - with my younger sister and my younger brother, so this was something that we had in common. But his approach was very much everybody do their own thing and, whatever that is, that's fine. There was never any pressure one way or the other. Even with his namesake, my brother, there was never any pressure to do anything similar, and he's an architect here in town and ended up going in a completely different direction. I remember speaking to my mother, and for a while she was against my retiring. She said, "They keep offering you embassies. Why don't you go? Don't you want to be an ambassador?" I said, "No, I don't want to be an ambassador. I've had it. I've done 50 years of this stuff. It's not worth it to me." "Oh, yes, well, maybe but don't you want..." It was much more that she thought that was the right way. And, of course, many of my contemporaries in the Service would feel the same way. "What did you bother to come in for if you don't want to be an ambassador?" Well, the day-to-day experiences were to me much more important than having that ultimate goal. But I think she would have liked that, but at the same time, you know, she's fine.

Q: I assume you took and passed the written exam.

HORSEY-BARR: No, I didn't. I took it and failed. But I was determined to be in the Foreign Service, so when I graduated, I went to work in the Passport Office as an apprentice. Those were the days of Frances Knight. If you haven't interviewed anybody about Frances Knight, you...

Q: Oh, I've had a lot of people, and I've even interviewed Frances Knight but unfortunately it was towards the end of her compos mentos time. It was about almost 12 or 13 years ago. She just died recently, but she was not really with it too much. But, of course, her name is legend, as was Ruth Shipley's before then. So tell me about...

HORSEY-BARR: I started working there. I had another job after I graduated from college for a bit, but then in January of '71 I started working there and I was there for two and a half years before I managed to get into the Foreign Service. I worked in the foreign area, which was fascinating.

Q: In what area?

HORSEY-BARR: It was called Foreign Operations, and essentially what they did there was to adjudicate citizenship claims, the complicated ones, the ones the posts didn't have the authority to decide. That was fascinating because they were like jigsaw puzzles. There were a number of different, overlapping, contradictory citizenship laws on the books. They've all been kind of wiped out now. I guess in the late '70s it all changed, or '80s. But anyway, at the time it was very complicated, and so you'd have these arcane cases of people born, divorced, whatever in the Philippines. It was fascinating because each one was sort of like a little game and you had to figure it out, and then the whole puzzle sort of fell into place. So that was a lot of fun, but it was also very strange because I, of course, made it very clear from the beginning that I was only using the place as a stepping stone to get in the Foreign Service.

Q: Frances Knight considered the Foreign Service to be the enemy.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, she did, and the relationship between the Passport Office and the rest of the State Department could not have been worse. If you ever wanted to go over to the main building, you certainly didn't tell anybody you were doing that.

Q: Barbara Watson during part of that time.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, Barbara Watson, and they had these running duels, Barbara Watson and Frances Knight. It was really quite interesting.

Q: Did you have any dealings with Frances Knight or any stories?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, not too much actually, because I was obviously pretty junior at that point, but I had a friend that ran the file room and there was much talk about Frances Knight and her manipulation of files, if you will, for J. Edgar Hoover and all that sort of business, some of which has appeared in the press, I guess. So he would tell me stories about the file system, the one she kept. I can't remember whose they were. She kept them in her own little safe. God knows what was really going on, but she was a terror and most people there really were terrorized by the woman and you minded your P's and Q's. If you didn't, you were out of there pretty quick, pretty quickly. I guess I tolerated it all about a year. The work itself was fun, but atmosphere was quite bizarre. Then I started trying to get into the Foreign Service laterally with just the oral exam - they had some program there - and that was very successful. I got right in, and then I think I was in the Foreign Service class in '73.

Q: Do you recall in the oral exam any of the questions asked or how it went?

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, I remember being dreadful in economics and I remember running into out in the hall - I can't remember his name - who had been on my panel. He's the only one I remember and he was an econ officer. I ran into him many years later and he said, "Well, how's it going, Sarah?" This was after I had already gotten a number of promotions. He said, "Are you doing very well?" I said, "Yes, no problem, but I'm really glad I decided not to become an economic officer." He said, "Yes, I would have voted on that one. That was definitely not your strong suit." We got to be friendly. He was a nice guy, although I can't remember his name. I remember a lot of questions about history and international relations, which didn't trouble me at all. The ones that did bother me, not surprisingly, were the ones about cultural life in the United States.

Q: Did you feel like there was a certain emphasis, saying, "I see you went to school here and there. Let's talk about America."

HORSEY-BARR: Well, it wasn't put that way. It was just, "Let's talk about this school of painting or whatever." I guess the arts aren't my strong point. I'm not terribly interested in them anyway, and certainly I wasn't going to be interested in the United States, but ask me about the Renaissance. "You've lived in Italy. Tell me about the Renaissance." No.

Q: The Hudson school of painting was not your bag.

HORSEY-BARR: No, I didn't know anything about it. Those were kind of amusing. But it went on for a couple of hours, and for the most part it was rather pleasant. I can't complain. And I didn't know the economics stuff. It had been my worst subject when I was at Georgetown. I hated it, and so I wasn't at all surprised when this guy - I wish I could remember his name; it'll come to me - said that to me later. I thought, yes, right, not surprised, at least he saw through that one.

Q: When did you come into the Foreign Service?

HORSEY-BARR: It was towards the end of '73, December or November '73. Again, I went out very early. I went out in February to my first post. Most people then came into a Foreign Service class and then stayed around as a class for probably a good six months between taking, of course, the junior officer course and then language and then the consulate business went on for weeks and weeks and weeks. I didn't, because I already had languages and I already had the consular stuff, because I had done it all sort of on the side while I was at the Passport Office. I had done the visa. I had done everything just for interest. Since I had already been in the State Department and these other people hadn't, I could do it. That was too bad in a way, because I think classes tend to coalesce.

Q: What was your class like?

HORSEY-BARR: Again very few women, I'd say maybe four or five women. All the guys - not all but most of them - went to Vietnam. I've always regretted actually that I didn't. I don't think they were sending women to Vietnam at that point, maybe they never were, but I always regretted not pushing, pressing the issue and trying to go there and actually getting there, because I think, especially for somebody like me that spent so much time overseas, that was such a pivotal issue for our generation. I still feel today that it would have been very nice, very interesting to go.

Q: Vietnam was running down too by '73. They had called back sort of the Vietnamese-trained officers. Junior officers I don't think were going out particularly then.

HORSEY-BARR: A good number of ours did. Maybe it's just the ones that were single at that point. I don't know; I just remember it was an issue for the class. I can even remember one guy, who was dreadfully opposed to the policy, actually resigned right then and there because he was supposed to go to Vietnam and said, "I'm not going," right there. God knows what he's done in the meantime. I do know that a fair number were still going. I'm sure it wasn't like five, eight years earlier when entire classes were sent to Vietnam. But I do feel that that was a missed opportunity. It was such a central issue for our generation, and since I had been overseas for much of the civil rights thing and actually much of the Vietnam thing, I just think that I could have learned a lot about this country and the way it worked by having had some more direct involvement, but there we are.

Q: You know the old Civil War expression, "Go out and see the elephant," which meant to experience war. I volunteered. I went to Vietnam, because I wanted to see the elephant, I wanted to see what this was all about. I was Counselor General in Saigon from '69 to '70, about 18 months. It was interesting. I'm glad I did. This was a major issue, and you kind of like to be on the scene.

HORSEY-BARR: Well, it provides a different level of understanding than just reading about it. I understand things better if I can experience them rather than just reading about them. Also, there was so much unhappiness amongst many of the FSOs that had been in Vietnam when they came back. I think it would have been easier to understand. My husband, when he discusses it, has often said, "You know, you're out there" - he was with Core - "and you're managing this program and these troops and whatever, and you have all this responsibility and it really is life and death." Then his next assignment was coming back to SS. He said, "And now they want me to clean out the toilets and clip hedges." And each person would have had a different experience in Vietnam.

Q: There was so much, because there was a lot of responsibility, and then to come back and be number-five man in the economic section is a little hard to do.

HORSEY-BARR: It's hard to understand that unless you can appreciate the responsibility that those people had and the environment in which they worked in Vietnam. If you weren't there, forget it.

Q: One last question, and then we'll stop for the day. At the time you came in, was there the married woman's issue? What were you getting?

HORSEY-BARR: God knows. I don't remember ever paying it any mind at all. Maybe that was something that had to do with my father's initial ambivalence about my coming in. Didn't they change the rule in the mid-'70s?

Q: Yes, it was around the time you came in. It had never been actually a rule; it had been just a custom.

HORSEY-BARR: Oh, really? I thought it was a Personnel regulation.

Q: Well, it might have been, but there was no law. It had acquired the ambiance or patina of law, but it wasn't really.

HORSEY-BARR: I don't remember ever thinking about it, but then again I never really thought about getting married either, so it was not germane.

Q: This is interesting, just as an aside. Was there a change? In earlier generation coming through college, with most young women the main idea was you wanted to get the MRS degree. But by the time you came through this was kind of over? Women were thinking, "I'm going to work."

HORSEY-BARR: I'm going to work. Yes, at least with my group of friends there wasn't any of this "Let me see about getting married." Yes, everybody had their boyfriends or what have you or had broken up or were kind of on the rebound or whatever, but the main focus was in fact much like the men, getting a job. In fact, most of my group went on and got graduate degrees right away and then started working - I didn't do that till later - law degrees, political science, Ph.D.s, whether they were male or female. There wasn't this emphasis on getting married. I don't know if in the United States as a whole the average age at which women were getting married was already rising.

Q: It had to be.

HORSEY-BARR: It would make sense. Why would this group have been so different?

Q: Of course, we're talking about a college-educated generation, which is different than maybe a working-class one. I may be wrong, but I would think that logic would say there would be some difference.

HORSEY-BARR: I don't think there was that sort of approach at that point.

Q: I'll tell you what. We'll stop at this point. So we got to 1973, and you were off to your first post - and we haven't talked about it - which is where?

HORSEY-BARR: Port-of-Spain, Trinidad.

Q: Okay, so you're off to Trinidad, and we'll pick it up at that point.

This is the 26th of July 2000. Sarah, you're off to Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. You were there from '73 to when?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, actually it was from '74 till the middle of '76. No, you're right. It was '73, because it was a three-year assignment in the end. I extended for a year.

Q: What was the situation on Trinidad when you went there? Can you give me sort of a feel for the politics and the economy and American interests there.

HORSEY-BARR: Well, just about everything was affected by the economy because Trinidad, of course, has oil. The price of oil, I can't remember exactly what it was back then, but it was high, so they were living high on the hog. In terms of politics the government was controlled by a Eric Williams. Trinidad got independence, I believe, in the late '60s, so they hadn't been an independent country for terribly long. Eric Williams' approach to life was sell oil, and he was very anti-US, saw the United States as essentially exploiting countries such as his. He had two policies that stick in my mind. I'm sure there were plenty more, but the ones that stick in my mind were that he would not permit tourism development on the island. He didn't need it so much because, of course, they had the oil revenue at the time, but he did not want Americans coming down and living in a tourist fashion. He also wanted to export whatever unemployment he had to the United States, which is interesting because, of course, that then became a big issue with Mexico. It still is today in terms of exporting and exploiting unemployed people. But Trinidad was pretty calm in those days. It has had some periods of unrest since. I guess from a political standpoint it wasn't terribly interesting. I was a visa officer, as I suppose almost everybody is on their first post, and I enjoyed it. Trinidadians are very open, warm people, very educated. Actually it was the first experience I had had living in a non-Caucasian culture. Trinidad, as you know, is almost 50 percent black, Afro-American if you will, and 50 percent East Indian. That was an interesting experience for me. But all were very well educated and mostly, a high percentage, living in the city. Already it was starting then for folks leaving the farms, so there were still a good crop. A small embassy...

Q: Who was the ambassador at the time?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, I just don't know. With the series of political appointees, I just don't know. There were, I think, 3 ambassadors during my tour, so none of them must have stayed very long.

Q: It doesn't sound like...

HORSEY-BARR: It was a very sleepy little place at that time.

Q: There was Anthony Marshall, Lloyd Miller, and Albert Fay.

HORSEY-BARR: None of them have left any lasting impressions.

Q: How did we handle the visa problem?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, most days I would just say no. There wasn't as much. I suppose, as in so many walks of life today, there's a lot of doing things right. Even with children and education and discipline, it's quite different than it was 25 years ago, and I suppose the way one handled visas in those days reflected the society at large. It was, I think, easier to say no without having a lot of explanation required than it probably is today. There was a bit of an informal economy, which is often very difficult to measure, as, I suppose, in so many less developed countries, because the people just don't have the normal objectives or things you look for as ties to the country. I guess the highest percentage of no's went to Indians because they were primarily agricultural and had a tradition - perhaps as they do in India; I don't know - of kind of safeguarding their wealth in jewels, in gold jewelry, and so it was very difficult for these officers. Another group that was difficult to tell but were very good risks, as I found over time, were government employees, who earned next to nothing, such as most of their teachers, earned next to nothing but had such good benefits once one looked into it, that comparable salary and benefits packages in the States would not have been comparable enough in the financial sense. It was still a fairly stratified society, so one could assess groupings. I remember playing carniway, at the carnival because Trinidad is a big carnival place, and they had what they called bands, which are masses of, say, hundreds of people in groups of 30 or 40 with an overall theme, and each group of 30 or 40 would represent one aspect of whatever the theme of the band is. I remember the expression there is 'playing mats' as in playing matchsticks - they use that expression - and I did this several years running. There were always newspaper articles about the visa officer plays mats.

Q: What were you doing?

HORSEY-BARR: You mean with the carnival?

Q: Yes.

HORSEY-BARR: Well, one would join a band, as they call it. The band had a theme, and there were rival bands, generally run by artistic folks. Each band had a theme, and then these smaller groups of, say, 30 or 40 people would kind of pick one element. You would go to the band store, and depending on what your price range is, you'd end up in one sort of grouping or another - it was generally dictated by price - and so you got your costume. Then on the appointed days you went off with your band and everybody danced in the streets in the carnival to the calypso music and drank rum under the hot sun. That was the thing to do, and it was a lot of fun. Everybody did it; Trinidadians from all walks of life did it. Sort of all barriers came down, and it was really a leveling and sort of unifying experience for the whole country, and persists today. They probably have them in Washington now. They have the Trinidad carnival up in Adams Morgan. I've not been but...

Q: Calypso music, of course, particularly shortly after the war and during the war, was very popular in the United States. I think of Lord Invader and some of these other people...

HORSEY-BARR: It was, and I think the United States adopted a rather simple kind of calypso music. Calypso, calypso music, by and large, the lyrics to their music is generally of a political satire nature. It's very difficult to appreciate each year's calypsos unless you've been a part of the society, because it just sort of grows out of whatever's been happening in the country that year. The ones, I think, that we got early on in the United States were all about women and men and sun, and love and things like, more than political...

Q: Rum and Coca Cola was kind of that ilk, that type of thing.

HORSEY-BARR: But if you really knew what was going on in the society, they're absolutely fabulous. Well, there was an interesting thing too on that point, because while the society revolved around carnival and calypso competitions and stuff, the folks didn't make any money. Many of the better known calypsonians actually came to the United States and Canada to practice their other-than-music professions. They had other, more regular professions and oftentimes left the island completely just to make money.

Q: How did Eric Williams' hostility towards the United States translate itself, say, to the embassy and your work?

HORSEY-BARR: There would be regular articles about the embassy and policies and such, but it didn't translate in terms of interfering or with hostility by the general population. It was almost a personnel thing, which is interesting because I think at least one or two of his children were born here and raised here in the United States, but I guess that's not unusual.

Q: Where were the Trinidadians going in the United States?

HORSEY-BARR: New York. There's still today a big concentration of Trinidadians in New York.

Q: What were they doing there?

HORSEY-BARR: I don't know, I think probably anything they could do. I don't remember any particular kind of person, if you will, that left more regularly than others, at least that we knew.

Q: I was just thinking of Jamaica. At least at one time many were going to the United States, the sort of New York area, to work as maids and that sort of thing, which meant that you get some very irate calls from very high-placed people in the United States because they weren't getting their maid or housekeeper. I was wondering whether you were getting that.

HORSEY-BARR: I don't remember anything particular around those lines. We may have and it just didn't register.

Q: Did Castro have any sort of effect where you were?

HORSEY-BARR: No. I think there was entirely too much prosperity and they were really reveling in it. There were no kind of socialist leans that I can recall at this time. I don't remember running across Castro at all.

Q: How about social life? Was it easy to mix with...

HORSEY-BARR: Very, very easy to mix. I found Trinidadians, people just like Trinidadians. The Indian ones were still at that time more agriculturally based and therefore not as present in the city and very much family oriented. Black Trinidadians formed the government and were more numerous by far in the city and very open. I suppose there was prejudice there, but I certainly didn't feel it and never had any trouble making friends with blacks. Whatever prejudice there was overwhelmingly between the blacks and Indians. They had strong dislike for each other, and a resident sort of British group. There was a lot of animosity toward them, but their numbers were so small that it really didn't permeate. I remember the country club. The country club was, I think if I'm not mistaken, still all white, which was a farce because there just weren't any whites. It was pretty absurd. But the yacht club, I had a little Sunfish and I learned to play golf, went out there every day, and none of those places were in the least bit of that nature. Trinidadians like to party and like socializing and would have all-day events where people would come and go, dancing and all, very casual, very laid back. They're an open people. I had lots of friends there.

Q: Well, it sounds like they almost had to pry you out of there.

HORSEY-BARR: As I said, I did extend for a year, and I enjoyed it very much. I suppose everybody enjoys their first post. People seemed to have a certain fondness....

Q: Learning the ropes and...

HORSEY-BARR: Learning the ropes, and you're young and you don't have much responsibility. I had a lot of fun. I did a lot of traveling when I was there all over the country, and at that time they had great incentives. If you're a resident of CARICOM, you could get like 60 percent off airlines and hotel rates during the off season, so it was very inexpensive. So I went almost everywhere, the former British places in the Caribbean. It must not have been very expensive because I was a vice consul so I wasn't making very much. I don't know, I can't remember, but it must have been pretty inexpensive. But anyway, I came back to Washington and I worked in the Bureau of Consular Affairs. I came back because a friend of mine, Laurent Morin, said I had to leave Trinidad at some point and said he was forming this special or new sort of R&D unit to figure out how to do consular affairs more efficiently or something, and would I join this operation, which I did then. So I came back to do that, and then that all fizzled after the three of us got assembled. That fizzled rather quickly, and he went off.

Q: London, was it?

HORSEY-BARR: It might have been London, or Jamaica.

Q: Or Jamaica. He went as ambassador. He was ambassador...

HORSEY-BARR: He was ambassador to Jamaica, but I think that was later. I think it was London. I went to stay with him in Jamaica, and I think...

Q: I believe he was Consul General to London.

HORSEY-BARR: He must have gone off to London at that point. Well, anyway, nobody else quite knew what to do at this point, so it all sort of fizzled. Then I became staff assistant and press officer for CA (Consular Affairs)

Q: Who was the head of CA at that time?

HORSEY-BARR: Barbara Watson. Press business didn't make too much difference in those days. Consular Affairs wasn't getting that much press and probably didn't see all that much about public relations.

Q: You did this from '76 to...

HORSEY-BARR: I did it from '76 to '78 I guess.

Q: Tell me about Barbara Watson.

HORSEY-BARR: I can't remember that much about her position on policy or what have you. Many evenings after the work was done we'd sit around her office and talk about the old days in Harlem, and that was fascinating. Her family came from the elite of Harlem, and there were so many fabulous artists in Harlem in the days she was growing up. It was a real treat to be able to sit there and hear stories about Harlem in the good old days. She was an interesting woman.

Q: Did you ever hear about her and dealing within your department and Congress?

HORSEY-BARR: She had very good ties with Congress. Who were her special people there... I can't remember. But she had very close links, positive, warm links with several members of Congress that were involved in immigration issues, and I can't remember who they were. She had equally frigid relations with J. Edgar Hoover and Frances Knight, which provoked any number scenes of fights, bureaucratic and otherwise, back and forth. I started off actually in the Passport Office, and so I sort of came from having seen it from a very junior level obviously. I was still serving in the Passport Office, having seen these fights between Frances Knight and the rest of the State Department generally embodied in the person of Barbara Watson. So when I was there with Barbara Watson I saw it on the other side.

Q: Well, there really were practically no relations with the press.

HORSEY-BARR: Well, the two of them didn't talk. I don't know how it worked from a policy standpoint. It's difficult for anybody, and I'm not even sure that Frances might have called on the Secretary of State. When I was in the Passport Office, I remember people treating me as a pariah when I decided I wanted to go in the Foreign Service I mean things were that frigid and distant.

Q: In working with Barbara Watson in the Counselor Bureau, there must have been a lot of Congressional pressure to issue visas, to do this, do things for Americans.

HORSEY-BARR: No, I don't know that there was that much. Now, it may just be remembering wrong. I just read recently about the phenomenal explosion in travel, particularly overseas travel by Americans, and they'd always take me by surprise, because the period of time in which this happened is generally referred to as the last 20 years. So I sort of think that I have to be careful in not attributing the current things that happen to what was going on 20 years ago. I don't know how many Americans really were traveling overseas in the mid-'70s and to what extent there was any trouble. As I remember the Bureau in those days, the focus was much more on immigration, and Mexico was a big issue. I remember organizing several conferences for Bureau principals to go down to southern California and Texas and try to do sort of outreach explaining the immigration laws and addressing the question of illegal immigration even then. I just don't remember that much went on as a regular sort of thing. I remember, who was that actor, I think it could have been Kris Kristofferson. I remember there was enough going on about drugs, Americans and drugs overseas, at the same time that movie came out about the American in a Turkish jail.

Q: Oh, yes, Midnight Express.

HORSEY-BARR: Midnight Express, right. I remember we somehow organized Kris Kristofferson to do some public service announcement about drug use overseas. It was good that there was some of that going on, but I just don't remember a whole lot of that going on. Now that part of her review that deals with American citizens and services is enormous, and I just don't remember it being that much of a thing. [Inaudible.]

Q: Did you feel at that time that you were part of a counselor corps or was this just another assignment as opposed to being sort of a general Foreign Service Officer and getting out of it and doing something else?

HORSEY-BARR: I didn't give it much thought. It's the same sort of thing when people ask if I encountered discrimination in the Foreign Service, so I never really gave it much thought. I guess I sort of got blinders on, and just march on and do my own thing. Now, I did when I came into the Foreign Service and when I came in as a consular officer and certainly while working as an FSO in the Passport Office. The three years or two and a half years I was there before I became an FSO certainly made me an expert on passport and citizenship law, and then, of course, Trinidad and the visa and end of things, so maybe it did. But when I left there, I left CA and went into admin work. I don't remember it being a conscious big-deal thing. I wanted to try something other than consular work.

Q: How would you say relations between Barbara and the people she supervised?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, from where I sat people liked her. It was different if you're in a front office, of course, than if you had some other office in the Bureau. But again, unlike today, I think the Bureau - it would be interesting if one knew the numbers - I always thought that the Bureau was much smaller then, especially since you have to kind of forget from the calculations the whole passport operation at that time. But even in the other two were much smaller than they are now, so it was a much more close-knit operation than now. In terms of her relations with the rest of the Department, I think the closest bureau that we were having the most problems with immigration, legal and illegal. And actually that's one of the reasons why I went over there, because Bob Gershenson, who was the resident director there at the time, was particularly sensitive to all these visa processing public relations issues. We had started working together on what he called consular assistance teams.

Q: CAT

HORSEY-BARR: CAT, exactly, and he was really positive and he would set aside certain sums of money, and the idea was to try to go out to a problem post A, B, or C, figure out what needed to be done, gain the sort of acceptance and participation of the people there, American and FSN and knowing that there was money to fix it, if you needed whatever if you needed new furniture, but more importantly if you needed more structure in order to push people in one way or the other to make them more efficient when they needed training, then the money was a guarantee Well, I don't know if that's ever been done where the money is set aside before you had a solution, and it made an enormous difference in terms of getting the cooperation and involvement of the people on site and, of course, getting the job done. But that didn't last more than a year or two.

Q: What was the role of Ron Somerville at that time?

HORSEY-BARR: Ron's very nice. He's almost Machiavellian. I have never in my life met anybody who could maneuver the bureaucracy. He knew where so many bones were buried, and he's so clever at maneuvering people on issues to further advance to his mark.

Q: I always thought he was a very effective person to have there.

HORSEY-BARR: Oh, yes.

Q: The counselor package was quite important, because I think we were the only part of the Department that could quantify...

HORSEY-BARR: That's right, and we were enormously successful in getting money in because of that, money that was needed.

Q: Yes, that was the game, but we would show that there is growth in this and this and this and that we're doing it with so many people. It broke down very nicely.

HORSEY-BARR: Right, and if I remember correctly, that was his idea. But, you know, Ron was full of good ideas, but the overwhelming thing was his ability to move through that bureaucracy. I have never seen anything like it since. In fact, I worked for Ron years later, well about the late 80's. In the late '80s I worked over there and I was still as impressed as I had been in the very beginning

Q: How did he work with Barbara Watson?

HORSEY-BARR: Oh, extremely well. I think she trusted him implicitly. Of course, you know, then there was the question of who was really running the show with Ron, because he definitely had his own agenda. Barbara Watson was a smart lady, a lawyer, if I remember correctly. She was an attorney, and she very much enjoyed the job and the issues. I don't know if she was as dedicated as Ron was to the issues of the Bureau. Wasn't she there twice?

Q: She was there twice, yes. She was then at the very end was ambassador to Malaysia.

HORSEY-BARR: She did go as ambassador?

Q: Yes, for a little while. Really before this period I remember she came to Athens. She was sort of a granddame. She had things just right.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, that's right, because she did appreciate things that were just right and she would change it if things weren't quite right. She enjoyed having men around her too. I can't imagine her ever having a front office for women ambassadors even if it were today.

Q: Compared to what we have now.

HORSEY-BARR: Right. But she liked having gentlemen around.

Q: Well, she was appreciated. As a consular officer I felt we had a friend in court for the first time. Before it had been sort of an ethnic political dumping ground for people. They'd put in a Polish person or Jewish person or Irish person or something like this, and they would say there were close to immigration and had given that as sort of a bone tossed for the political process. And then she came in and I think they thought they were getting a black person, and they weren't. They were getting a queen who had a far greater role.

HORSEY-BARR: And then did have interest in the subject. Yes, she was good for CA, I think.

Q: Well, in '78 somebody must have been breathing down your neck and saying Sarah you are on your way somewhere or something.

HORSEY-BARR: Well, no, we had formed these consular assistance teams, and so then I went over to ARA because that was the one bureau that was given and put their money where their mouth was, but in the person of Bob Richardson. So I went over there and did that for a year.

Q: That would be '78-'79.

HORSEY-BARR: Right, about that. Then I was also post management officer for Panama. The consular assistance teams, I guess Bob Richardson, moved on to something else. Again, that sort of fizzled in terms of the money, the guarantee of money. Without the guarantee of money, the concept sort of fell flat. Sort of like inspectors or whoever, we just never knew if it was really going to come to pass or when, and that made the involvement by local folks much more attenuate. So then I did regular post management stuff and never really got thrilled about that.

Q: You did that when?

HORSEY-BARR: I did that during the same period, more business stuff. I really never enjoyed it. And so, at the end, I went for leave without pay, and I guess we left in September of '79 and I went out West to Thunderbird.

Q: You were on leave without pay from when to when?

HORSEY-BARR: September '79 to January '81.

Q: Was this just the hell with it or...

HORSEY-BARR: Well, I was considering leaving, yes, but the immediate purpose was to get a master's in business administration.

Q: This is at Thunder...

HORSEY-BARR: Thunderbird. Now it's called something different. Before it used to be called Thunderbird.

Q: Thunderbird, it's still management, international...

HORSEY-BARR: Right.

Q: Where in Arizona

HORSEY-BARR: Just north of Phoenix. It was on the site an Air Force base. I think that's where it gets its name. Now it's called something else. It's called American Graduate School of International Management. It started off as a business management school with a different philosophy and a different orientation. It was always focused towards overseas business as opposed to most business schools in the States. It started off focused on just Latin America. It also had a different approach in that it was very practically oriented as opposed to the theoretical approach of some of the Eastern business schools, which again has been abandoned in the last 40 years, but certainly in the beginning it was much more theoretical. But I thought it would be nice and I had never been west of the Appalachians and the focus on Latin America was interesting to me. So I did that. And in those things in the Department, it was pretty routine that you could get leave without pay. Not so now, I gather.

Q: Were you sort of looking around for another job?

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, I thought I might not come back. I wasn't looking for a job at the time, but I was kind of bored, bored with the State Department, certainly bored with the admin work. At the end of that year I did interview with a number of companies, and then I found that the people I was interviewing with were places that I would have been doing very similar work to the Foreign Service only I would be starting at the bottom. At that point my time in State Department was only about 10 years. I thought to myself "Why are you going to do the same sort of thing somewhere else and start off at the bottom and throw away 10 years. If you want to kind of do the same thing, you might as well stick with what you got and go back to the State Department." And so I did.

Q: So in '81 what did you do?

HORSEY-BARR: So in January of '81 I went off to Honduras as consul general. Well, I wasn't actually consul general right away. I went off as number-two for three months or six months until the consul general left, and then I was consul general.

Q: You were in Honduras from...

HORSEY-BARR: January of '81 until about June or so of '84.

Q: What was the sort of political economic situation in Honduras at that time?

HORSEY-BARR: Oh, that was very interesting, because the whole Contra operation, the whole Nicaraguan operation, was just starting, and no one else in the embassy could talk to these insurgents because at that time we didn't have a policy of supporting them. I think the Argentines were supporting them. But we didn't. So the only folks in the embassy couldn't have any dealings with these people, but we could in the consular section, and so they would come in for visas. So everybody would slip me these list of questions and, "If so-and-so comes in, find out this that and everything." It made it very interesting, because to a large extent we were where the action was. The nice thing about consular work, in my experience, was that if you did the job well, everybody would leave you alone, which was nice, not to have people breathing down your neck, and not to be in a position I found when I was later a political counselor as being the ambassador's staff aide essentially. But the other nice thing about consular work was that you could think very creatively about the situation you were in and almost anything you wanted to get into you really could, because there was very little that would be going on that didn't somehow relate to protecting Americans or figuring out who was leading the country and why and how, and so it gave enormous scope for getting into society and really doing the formatting of different things. It gave a freedom that, as I looked at colleagues in other sections, I never quite saw duplicated in other sections.

Q: What was the government of Honduras like from your perspective.

HORSEY-BARR: Honduras never had the disparity between rich and poor that's so typical of other countries in Latin America and particularly Central America. They are sort of mediocre. At that point they were stable, unlike other countries. At least in 1981 there weren't any strong leftist inclinations. What they wanted was money, money for development. There was a large amount of corruption. And there was an almost exclusive focus on the United States politically, socially, economically. The country was dominated economically by the U.S. Banana Company. In many respects it was a satellite, a satellite of the United States.

Q: Were they having human rights problems there?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, they were, but people didn't talk very much about them in the late '70s. By the time they started talking about them in the '80s, our policy required Honduras to be in a partnership but there was very little talk about them then. Now, there has been a lot of talk about what was going on in the '90s, but there wasn't much talk about it then. Yes, there were abuses going on. I guess in the '80s the most one heard about regularly were the police abuses, but the army abuses were well known. But the overriding concern was keeping Honduras as our ally in the Central American difficulties.

Q: What sort of thing did the Contras play in the politics of the Nicaraguan conflict?

HORSEY-BARR: They didn't really play in the politics. They played in the US-Honduras relationship, because essentially we give the Hondurans billions of dollars in aid, and in return Honduras let the Contras train and have camps on their soil from which they could go back into Nicaragua. But there wasn't that much discussion in the press publicly except on a couple of occasions. The border roads would be mined, and every now and again somebody would get blown up and, of course, that would be reported in the press, but it was accepted. In many of those societies the people that were being blown up were the peasants, and the line between sort of the peasant level and the folks that controlled the press, controlled the economy, controlled politics was really insurmountable. So, yes, it was reported, but it wasn't the better off, the better connected, the better educated that were getting blown up. They weren't out in the country on these border roads. So it was reported sort of matter of fact, never a big here and cry about it. There were a couple of instances which did provide a lot of attention, ongoing attention. One was when a couple of American journalists got blown up in one of these border wars. One of them was a reporter for the L.A. Times. That was in '83, if I remember correctly. And, of course, that got picked up on in a big way by the US press, and the story lived on and on, opened the door to just what were these reporters doing there and what was the United States interest and so on. And another time, which was perhaps that same year or the next year - I can't remember - an American priest, and American Jesuit, accompanied a column of Nicaraguan guerillas across the jungle mountains into Honduras and disappeared, died. Then there was a lot of attention, which goes on even today, about what happened to this American Jesuit. I think that incident - that was probably '83/'84 - was the first opening of the door to examining Honduras' human rights record stemming from the involvement of America.

Q: Was there a feel of threat from Nicaragua? Did Ollie North ever cross your sights?

HORSEY-BARR: No, not my sights. [Inaudible.] I just never had anything to do with him.

Q: Was there a feeling in the embassy that something's going on here?

HORSEY-BARR: Oh yes, everybody knew. I guess not everybody knew, but everybody knew something was going on. They often say that the happiest posts are the posts where there's pressure, and certainly people were very happy. People thought they had a mission, and looking back, it was very satisfying. What did Reagan care about? He cared about Nicaragua and he cared about Afghanistan. So if you wanted to be where there's action in the foreign policy sense, Honduras was one of the few places under Reagan where you certainly knew you were getting attention. In that sense I think it was very satisfying. It was interesting to watch the growth of the embassy over that period of time, because between, say, '82 and '85 the place tripled in size. Whereas in the early days it was a smaller post and everyone knew each other, now there were all kinds of strange characters walking around towards the end of that period. People had funny stories to tell about camping out on hillsides with night-vision goggles watching this, that and the other things. You'd meet them at parties and it would be the only time you'd ever see them. It was interesting in that sense.

Q: Who was the ambassador while you there, ambassadors?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, Briggs was there - no, not Briggs; what was his name? John Negroponte was there for most of my tour, but who was there when I first arrived in '81? I don't remember.

Q: That's all right. We've got Benz and then Negroponte.

HORSEY-BARR: And then Negroponte, exactly. John stayed, I guess, for about six months. Then John Negroponte was as prize given the fact that it was such a pivotal place in terms of the Reagan policy, he was a very strong person, John Negroponte. It became clear he knew exactly what he thought should be done to advance the policy

Q: Were you feeling any of the heat that was coming out of the United States that was descending on our ambassador in Nicaragua itself but sort of the liberal left, the literati of Hollywood and all, that had taken up the Sandinista cause and were giving the Reagan policy holy hell?

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, one saw that in the number of visitors that came through the embassy. Very few of them ever wanted to talk to the consular section. But my husband was in the political section and my closest friends were in USIA (United States Information Agency) and they would all be involved in these endless visits, hundreds of people every month, not just CODELs but private people to whom courtesies needed to be extended because of their interest, members of the press calling in for interviews, wanting to know what was going on. I wasn't directly involved in this sort of stuff. They weren't interested in consular stuff.

Q: Thank God.

HORSEY-BARR: Thank God, yes, because I was hearing stories from these other people. Their lives were absolute hell, because they were spending days each week taking care of these visitors and then they'd have their regular work to do on top of that. It was really six- and seven-day weeks for most of these people and very tiring.

Q: You mentioned a husband. I don't know if we ever discussed when you got married.

HORSEY-BARR: Well, we got married after that tour in Honduras.

Q: So you met your husband there?

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, I met him there on that tour, exactly. The people that were involved in the Central American issues were working day and night.

Q: Did visas raise their head there? Was this a problem or it was fairly routine?

HORSEY-BARR: We always had the problem of refusing, that usual sort of problem, but that was manageable. And, as I said, we did have the interesting aspects to that work that one didn't encounter elsewhere in terms of the Contras coming in and talking to them about things other than visas, if you will. And also, as things got more involved, it was interesting when high-ranking government or military officials would come in and figuring out what was it they were really going to be doing in the United States; those things and then the dead Americans who got blown up or disappeared from time to time.

Q: Did you send out search parties looking for the Jesuit?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, we didn't send out search parties because it truly was tropical canopy jungle. I remember going out several times with the family by helicopter, by military helicopter, going up and down these ravines. But those things don't last. When there's that kind of jungle, the decay rate was fairly rapid. And there aren't paths. Where do you go?

Q: Was there any feel about what had happened? You mentioned Nicaraguan guerillas. Whose guerillas were these?

HORSEY-BARR: I don't know if they were manipulated or organized by a higher party, but they were about, oh, 80 to 100 of them and they were coming over to Honduras to engage in terrorist acts.

Q: These were essentially from the Sandinista side?

HORSEY-BARR: Yes.

Q: The lower ranks of the Catholic Church were pretty much in bed with the Sandinistas.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, exactly. And the southern part of Honduras had a number of churches and priests that sort of espoused the more radical liberation theology. And these guys were coming across. The priest in question had in fact worked in Honduras earlier down in the south. So he came with them, and most of the rest of the column were 16-, 17-, 18-year-olds. This guy was in his late 60s, so just from a physical standpoint it's not surprising to think that he might have perished. Of course, the family and other extremists in the United States insisted that the Honduran army had captured and tortured him to death, and that's why they didn't come up with the body. Who knows? Perhaps they did. I don't think so, but it's possible. His vestments were recovered and his Bible and what have you, but his body wasn't. But a lot of men and women - there were women there, too - who were considerably younger and, according to other eye-witness reports, in considerably better shape than this priest died. There was nothing to eat in those jungles either. There's no game to catch or fruit or anything like that apparently. They described the most awful conditions. So I don't know what actually happened to him. His family wrote a book in which they speak really castigatingly, if you will, towards our efforts. But what can you do?

Q: Within the embassy, the officers of the embassy, was there any dissention in private or something that maybe we shouldn't be doing this or we should be nicer to the Sandinistas or anything?

HORSEY-BARR: I never picked that up at all. I think most people in the embassy thought the Sandinistas were pretty awful people. The people that I know from that period in Honduras that I've seen since certainly haven't changed their minds. No, I didn't detect that. It was interesting at that time, and later in the '80s too, how few FSOs go to Central America, and you hear about people not wanting to go because they didn't agree with the policy. I don't know if the people that were there when I was there, I don't know how many of them agreed with the policy strongly or not strongly, but I think there was overwhelmingly the sense that, hey, we're where the action is and that's what we're in this business for. So clearly whatever, if you want to call it, morality or right and wrong about the situation, you might have thought about was not that strong to take over a feeling of being at the center of what the United States is all about in the foreign policy sense at that time. I never heard anybody say that. But it was interesting to think of how many people's careers got ruined by Central America, and there was a fair number, and I think that was because of politics in the Department and politics on the Hill and how many people wouldn't come, how often those jobs were going vacant because nobody would bid on them.

Q: Was it a matter of conviction or just 'this is a hot potato' and because of the Congressional pressure and some of the true believers in the State Department...

HORSEY-BARR: I don't know, but either way, any way you cut it, doesn't speak very well to the Foreign Service. At a subsequent time I was desk officer for Ireland. In fact, when I came back in '84 I remember just being appalled at how many people bid on DCM Dublin. There'd be 120 or 130 people, and at the same time you couldn't get anybody to go to Central America, but you had a lot of people joining the Foreign Service. It's all very well that we all like a nice post every now and again, but to me...

Q: Sounds like retirement place. There's nothing happening there.

HORSEY-BARR: Nothing happening there a perfectly pleasant but one doesn't need the Foreign Service to go and have a perfectly good life in Ireland, because whereas being involved in real policy issues, you can only do that in Honduras. But it's just an interesting thought. I don't know if that's the case today.

Q: It's hard to say, but I think the Service keeps changing all the time, and there's a tendency to try to get a job that looks good on paper.

HORSEY-BARR: A lot of people in Central America, as I said earlier, did not get supported by the system thereafter, did not get promoted, did not have a system in their embassies and things like that.

Q: Why was this?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, I think in the end, like everything else, it's a combination of factors, but if the system wants people to go and take the tough jobs, there should be ways to make sure that there is some reward other than...

Q: There was certainly a system that dealt with it fairly well in Vietnam.

HORSEY-BARR: There may be. I wish I had gone to Vietnam, but I didn't, so I don't know that much about it. But people not getting promoted, that's probably a combination of poorly written OERs, which can do it for you anytime, maybe broad antipathy toward Central America. I don't know. But people not getting embassies, having their names withdrawn because of strong Congressional feelings for the other side that's something that perhaps not at the very time but later on, could have been corrected. There are guys down there just now getting their first embassies that were in ARA at the time in the mid-'80s, and here we are year 2000 and they're just getting their embassies. That's absurd, 16 years. Some people did go on, but there are enough who did not that it makes you wonder whether when one perhaps says as a continuing effort, someone might look and say, "What happened to the people that did the tough job in the '80s? Did they get rewards?" In the future that might well argue to people not to take the tough jobs, because they see what happened the last time there was a very strongly felt issue in the United States.

Q: You had people in Congress who felt very strongly either on the right or on the left. I think Congress, when Reagan came in, set the stage by treating people particularly in Latin America as being, because they had been assigned there during the Carter time, as being sort of Carter loyalists, which was not the case at all. And I think there was a sort of backlash after that of those in Congress who had power saying, "If you're going to do that to our guys, we'll do this to your guys." Of course, people get caught in the middle.

HORSEY-BARR: That's right. Taking that approach with political appointees, I suppose, is a fair game, but taking it with career FSOs goes against the grain and certainly in my mind would encourage FSOs to take positions only in such instances where they believed in the cause, which I think for the long term is not healthy for the Foreign Service.

Q: Not at all.

HORSEY-BARR: I think of Joe Sullivan, who was assigned to Central America in the early '80s, got some place in Africa - I guess he's still there; he got it less than three years ago. I don't know where he is, but anyway he just got it a couple years ago. Mike Kozak, who just came out of Cuba - I don't know what's happening. They sent him to Cuba because they knew they couldn't get him confirmed. I don't know whether they're going to try to give him an embassy somewhere or not. Now, of course, being principal officer in Cuba is not a small job.

Q: Yesterday I was interviewing Jay Taylor, who was there with Kozak as his deputy, I think.

HORSEY-BARR: Did he mention where Mike is, by the way?

Q: No, he didn't.

HORSEY-BARR: The reason Mike went there was because they couldn't get him confirmed anywhere else, and I think he's still in the Department, so maybe there's a chance he will get an embassy. For people to whom having the title of ambassador is important, then you don't get it.

Q: In '84 you went back to Washington as Irish Desk?

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, I went back to EUR. Ireland, Northern Ireland, and Iceland were my domain.

Q: You did that from what, '84 to when?

HORSEY-BARR: '86, two years.

Q: How did you find that? I would think with the Irish one you would get caught up in Boston politics.

HORSEY-BARR: Oh, you did, very much, very much, Boston politics and the White House. State Department didn't run anything, as far as I could make out, on Northern Ireland, which is all that Ireland's about, Ireland and Northern Ireland, and it was all done from the White House. It was all domestic politics, generally Boston, who ran it. Nonetheless, it was an interesting experience. The Irish ambassador would always call up the White House, wouldn't have anything to do with us. But it was interesting to have that insight into American politics. Margaret Heckler was the ambassador.

Q: She had been a Congresswoman from Massachusetts. What was your impression of her?

HORSEY-BARR: A most unpleasant lady, most unpleasant, very much prima donna without too much of the social graces. Barbara Watson may have been a prima donna and probably was a prima donna but she at least had social graces.

Q: She was a lady.

HORSEY-BARR: She was a lady, exactly. I don't know. Margaret Heckler and I have never quite saw eye to eye on pretty much everything, so the care and feeding of her was difficult. I was glad not to be a DCM, however. The thing I found interesting was I just could not believe that these people were really fighting, they had been fighting for over 1,000 years. I remember just being aghast when I went to Belfast one time and a principal officer had a lunch for me and there were the two sides present, and they started arguing about it over lunch: "When you all did this back in 1492," or whatever it was and blah-blah-blah. I have never been involved in the Arab-Israeli thing, which must be fairly similar, but I was just amazed that people would be thinking back that many hundreds of years. For me, seeing all the signs of militarization and such was not a big deal having come out of Central America, seeing machine guns and camouflage and barriers on the road, but I remember being impressed when I was taking a train up to Belfast from Dublin and they had blown up the line. We had to get off and get bussed out, and everybody on the bus was oohing and aahing as we passed the guns and the camouflage guys and the tanks and whatever. "What is their problem? This is normal." For them it was all normal. That was an interesting and sobering experience to see what had become normal for me after those three years in Central America, and it was just a way of life to see machine guns around.

Q: I guess it's NOAD, or whatever it is, that's sort of the money-collecting arm of the IRA in the United States, isn't it?

HORSEY-BARR: That's what we thought anyway. They were disputed, going to mothers and children working and things like that, but that's what we thought. In that period of time it had a lot of bounce and had a lot of involvement by Americans in Northern Ireland.

Q: When you say involvement, these Irish Americans...?

HORSEY-BARR: Financial, and quite psychological. I don't recall any actual involvement in the fighting over there.

Q: You sort of have the feeling that there are an awful lot of elderly gentlemen in the bars of south Boston fighting the war with their mouths.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, but there are an awful lot of younger illegal Irish immigrants in the Boston area who, depending on what persuasion, would be feeding those fires. That was the other revelation to me. Of course, one could come up with the statistics and figure it out, but the idea that Ireland was really just like Central America in terms of being a poor country of Europe and having a per-capita income so far below the rest of Europe that it's major export was still people in the 1970s/1980s was again a real eye opener. You can read about these things, but to me it's the first-hand experience that makes them come alive, and that was just astounding to learn how people lived, the poverty level of people in Ireland and Northern Ireland when they're in fact part of Northern Europe. I had never really focused on the fact before that there were all these illegal immigrants from Ireland just as there were from anyplace south of the border.

Q: Did you have the feeling that these were being treated with a very light hand?

HORSEY-BARR: Oh, yes, because they fit in. I don't know if that's true all over the country but certainly in the Massachusetts area they were welcomed. They weren't treated the way others were.

Q: On the Irish desk, did Senator Edward Kennedy...

HORSEY-BARR: He was one of the good guys, as was the former Speaker of the House, O'Neill, Tip O'Neill. They used to call them the four horsemen, Kennedy, O'Neill, Moynihan - I can't remember who the fourth was - who were reasonable, reasonable people, obviously pro-Catholic but reasonable, not radical. They led any number of ventures in the Congress to try to provide assistance. I must say one of them I thought was a bit egregious and where they set up an assistance fund out of the AID budget, which I think persists today. It was supposed to be an inducement for peace, but it obviously never had that effect.

Q: Was this sort of a pay-off?

HORSEY-BARR: It certainly wasn't anywhere close to that in terms of the amount of money and it wasn't quite that obvious. The idea was, if I remember correctly, it was going to be set up.... The fund was to create jobs, the theory being that, if you got more Catholics in jobs, that would dissipate a lot of the tension, because the unemployment rate for Catholics was extraordinarily higher than it was for young Protestants, and so the idea was to create industry in Northern Ireland, which was not actually exclusive. Their primary focus was on the Catholics and you would lower the tensions and things would dissipate. But the fact is nobody wanted to build a business in Northern Ireland with the risk of being bombed being too great. I'm not sure if it originated in the Congress or if it originated in State, the idea of taking the Sullivan principles that were applied against South Africa or against businesses in South Africa, and applying them into Northern Ireland, and that has limited success.

Q: You came essentially, I guess, out of the Catholic, Italian Catholic Church, didn't you?

HORSEY-BARR: You mean personally?

Q: Yes, personally.

HORSEY-BARR: I suppose, just because I grew up in it.

Q: That's what I'm saying. Did you get a good look at the Irish Catholic Church?

HORSEY-BARR: No.

Q: I was wondering because, of course, things have changed but...

HORSEY-BARR: But it's still very much a looking-backwards kind of church as is, or at least was, the Italian Catholic Church at the time, and very conservative. They're both very conservative. I would say actually that the Irish Church was more conservative than the Italian Catholic Church. I guess it's something about proximity to the Vatican that makes you more liberal. "They're right there; they'll save us in the end." But the hand of the Catholic Church in Ireland is something that you didn't see in Italy, and certainly in Italy it would exist at the village level, the power of the priests, but in Ireland it went up much higher in society and wasn't confined to the village.

Q: They sort of laid down the law before they got there. Did the American Catholic church play a role when you were desk officer?

HORSEY-BARR: I didn't see any of that, but maybe they didn't have to when then had Moynihan, O'Neill, and Kennedy, and Reagan in the White House. They didn't have to worry.

There was always a lot of explaining, there was a lot of correspondence explaining to people just what it was we were doing or not doing or what was really going on over there or not. And then we can't forget that, you know, there was also Iceland in my portfolio, and we had a number of issues with Iceland, first of all the base and probably even more important at that time was a huge shipping dispute. Iceland, perhaps still today - I don't know - controlled all the shipping in and out of the country. I can't remember the details of this case, but it was Rainbow Navigation. It was this little upstart company, US company, called Rainbow, and Rainbow somehow found some loophole in the Icelandic law and started shipping to Iceland at much reduced rates. I can't remember the details now, but it rapidly became a major issue to the point where it was, in their case, at the prime minister level and went on easily for a year or year and a half. It pitted the unions on this side and so on, and that consumed a lot of time because it also had ramifications for the base and all the surveillance that we were doing on that base. So that took up a lot of time. So the days were not quiet by any means.

Q: How about visas as far the IRA and all? Was that beyond your pay grade, or did you get involved?

HORSEY-BARR: No, we didn't give them. Every year around St. Patrick's Day there would be some that would come up as an issue and people would test the waters and such, but they weren't that big a deal. I'm trying to remember. There's something you said that reminded me. Well, I can't remember. Have to think about it and bring it up next time.

Q: Did we have a pretty good file on the IRA people? Would the visa office check with you?

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, and now I remember what I was going to say. We also had a fair number of people - and it would come up in the visa process - who would say that they had renounced their IRA connections, and those were very interesting. If I remember correctly, the policy or rule was that they had to have done equally as much against as they had done for, something to that effect. I always found that kind of interesting, looking at that - what had they done before, and what did the Agency think they'd done before versus what had been done after? But those were the more interesting of visa questions.

Q: What about the Protestant side, the Ulster group? Was there an equivalent barring of people who belonged to Ian Paisley's group?

HORSEY-BARR: I would say no, but by and large they didn't need to be as nasty as the IRA because, of course, they had the Royal Ulster Constabulary, which could be very nasty in its own right. Now, it did so with the force of law. And they didn't have financial support from within the United States, and I suppose they didn't bomb people and what have you, but they could be fairly nasty. I think the volume of the kind of IRA activity on the Protestant side was less. Certainly there was terrorist activity going on, but they didn't have much reason to come over here anyway, so we didn't hear about them in terms of visas. They certainly weren't getting much support out of the United States.

Q: Were there any cases of IRA people caught here during your watch?

HORSEY-BARR: Not that I remember. I remember hearing of some, but I don't think they were on my watch. I don't have any recollection of having to deal with them. I'm probably thinking about that movie. You know, there was a movie a few years back about an IRA guy that comes to America and gets blown up or something. By mistake he is killed.

Q: With Iceland, were we concerned about Iceland moving out of NATO? Iceland was sort of the cork in the bottle as far as...

HORSEY-BARR: Not while I was involved. They were still very proud of their involvement. They were very worried about getting too close to Europe and too close to the United States, but that was more in an economic and cultural sense than a political/military kind of approach. When they would rattle our cage about the base, it was generally on cultural or economic basis, if you will.

Q: We were doing lots, radio, TV...

HORSEY-BARR: Precisely, yes, we were bombing, and we needed to help them figure out a way to cut off the airways so that the screen culture wouldn't become part of, this worldwide American culture. So they'd rattle our cage about the base, but the prime motivator was not get out of NATO.

Q: I may be wrong, but I think the Reykjavik conference took place after you left.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes.

Q: How about cod wars or that sort of thing? Was fishing a thing, or was that between the Brits and...

HORSEY-BARR: That was between the Brits and the Icelanders, exactly. We weren't dealing with that except to the extent that we were affecting these folks in their shipping and fishing industry, this Rainbow Navigation issue.

Q: I guess you wish it had gone away.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, well, it did in the end. Somehow it got solved. I don't know what the solution was, because it was after my time.

Q: Were you sitting there watching any sort of disputes between our reporting from London or from Belfast to the American embassy in London and our embassy in Dublin? Were they sort of on the same side?

HORSEY-BARR: No, they were all pretty objective so there wasn't much carping about what the other was reporting. There was obviously a different slant, but it seemed to be pretty objective. The Consul General in Belfast at the time was a guy called Sam Bartlett, and Sam was having a great time. He really loved the place and seemed to be loved by all. But in my conversations with him he could see things fairly objectively. Now, the guy in London was a fellow called Peter Reams, and he was fairly happy-go-lucky. He's still in the Department. I think he's going to retire in a couple years. I saw him the other day.

Q: I'm supposed to call him after this meeting about his mother, who was a secretary to two Secretaries of State.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, and his father was an FSO, too. In fact, Peter and I talked. We were both on the selection boards last year, and we talked about it. I hadn't realized about his mother. I don't know if she's alive or not.

Q: I think she is down in Florida.

HORSEY-BARR: Well, I'm sure Peter will be interested in this sort of stuff, because he told me that, if I remember correctly, he had done a lot of work with his father, but maybe it was with both of his parents, in terms of recollections about the Service. In fact, he told me how to get my dad's records if I wanted them. Anyway, Peter was in London at the time. Peter's not one to get involved emotionally or what have you, so I don't think he lost his objectivity about the whole thing. And, of course, Dublin's hopeless because Dublin's always encumbered by one of these political-appointee ambassadors of the Margaret Heckler or Kennedy family ilk.

Q: In a way they're sort of a write-off, aren't they?

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, right. I never paid that much attention because you knew what was going to come out of them anyway, but you could count on Sam and you could count on London not changing what Sam had to say, and you could count on Peter because both of them are level-headed, objective people. And our office director was another very level-headed person, Martin Wyneck. I don't know if you've talked to him. Marty's very level headed. So I think we were getting the straight scoop, not that we could necessarily react properly because of the politics.

Q: On some of these cases, something that matters dealing with Israel, you have sort of within the political process sort of true believers in the Israeli cause, usually of Jewish extraction, in Congress as staff aides and all. Did you have any true believers of the Irish cause that caused problems?

HORSEY-BARR: No. I mean there were, like the Congressman from New York who got defeated last fall. What is his name? De Mata. De Mata must have a lot of Irish people. He was always fairly vocal. And there were one or two others, but they were minor players when you consider Moynihan, Kennedy and the speaker. They controlled everything. Without them things didn't move up there, so there wasn't much in it for anybody else.

Q: Was there sort of an Irish issue the way that moving our embassy to Jerusalem as every primary season that becomes a cause that all the candidates have to pay obeisance to and then they forget about it?

HORSEY-BARR: No. St. Patrick's Day and then the end of July or August, right about now, is the marching season in Northern Ireland, and you just knew people were going to blow up bombs and have counter-demonstrations that turn violent and what have you, but that was not generated in this country.

Q: While you were here on the Irish desk dealing with trying to settle the Irish problem...

HORSEY-BARR: Oh, we weren't trying to settle it. We were just going along for the ride.

Q: Did you cause your own union at this point? Did you get married?

HORSEY-BARR: Oh, yes, I guess we did get married then. We got married in '85, so, yeah, it was right in the middle of all that. We got married in '85 when Al came back from Honduras, because he stayed on a year after I did.

Q: What is your husband's name?

HORSEY-BARR: Al Barr, Alfred Barr.

Q: Alfred Barr, okay. He's an FSO?

HORSEY-BARR: Yes. He retired in '93.

Q: I think this might be a good place to stop. We'll pick up the next time in '86. Where'd you go after the Irish desk?

HORSEY-BARR: I went to Consular Affairs, the Executive Office.

Q: Okay, we'll pick it up in Consular Affairs, the Executive Office.

This is August 11, 2000. You were saying that after you left Ireland you went to university training.

HORSEY-BARR: I went to university training at American University.

Q: What sort of training was that?

HORSEY-BARR: It was primarily in computers and telecommunications. Remember this was 1986, and at least in my exposure to the Department, we were and probably still are way behind the curve in terms of modern technology and communications and such. I thought that it would be a good thing to learn more than what the Department was offering at that time and that it might be particularly useful to get into that field and apply it more in Consular Affairs because automation was certainly the way of the future in Consular Affairs. So I applied for university training to study, as I said, communications and computers and telecommunications. And so I went off for nine months to American University and had an enjoyable time. Intellectually in terms of subject matter, it was very interesting to be once again in school, which was never one of my favorite places to be, but this time with people that were 20/25 years younger than I was, that was kind of interesting. I felt sort of like an interloper taking beginning computer courses and this sort of thing. I guess what strikes me most about that year was how little success I had towards the end of it in finding a job in the Department where I could utilize those skills, because in terms of being in the computer systems field in State and working it from that angle, the idea was that I wasn't enough of a specialist. I was too high ranking to kind of move into that. I can't remember what I was at that point, a two or maybe I had gotten to a one, I don't know. So I ended up going to the Executive Office of CA, and one of my portfolios there was in fact working with their automation staff. They were the one place in the Department that I was aware of that was fairly advanced in terms of automation, so I wasn't in the Systems Office, sort of the liaison between the Executive Office and the Systems Office.

Q: You were doing this from '87 to when?

HORSEY-BARR: What, in CA?

Q: Yes.

HORSEY-BARR: I only did that for a year.

Q: '87-'88. I wonder if you could explain the relationship between the Systems Office, which was the State Department's main computer office at that time, and Consular Affairs. I'll put it in perspective. Back in '78 or '79 I was in Seoul, and with the help of our DCM Tom Stern, we were trying to put in a computerized system in Consular Affairs, actually for the embassy, and the central office sent somebody out to help us do it, Turk Lewis, and apparently they weren't talking to Consular Affairs. We were reporting back what we were doing, but it seems like Consular Affairs was going its way and Systems was going its way. But now we're talking about 10 years later. How were relations?

HORSEY-BARR: Relations at that point were certainly a lot better than what you've just described. There's always a sort of impasse between the two offices, because so few people in the main part of the Bureau knew anything about automation or computers. Yet there were those that saw the potential in terms of reducing the complaints about poor service, reducing the continued skyrocketing need for officers to manage workloads and such. Ron Somerville, I thought, was very influential in a positive way in bringing the two together. He was on very good terms with the Systems Office management.

Q: He was the Executive Director...

HORSEY-BARR: He was Executive Director for what must have been 15 years for Consular Affairs, and the period that I was there fell within his tenure. I think I was there '87/'88, and I think he was hired about 1990 or thereabouts, a number of years after that. But he clearly saw the potential. Given his ability to know where all the bodies were buried and his ability to secure funds, the automation program was decently funded, considering the context of the poor funding overall for the State Department and the lack of very active interest in automation for other State Department functions. At that time the Consular Affairs Bureau had a rather unique relationship on the Hill and was very successful in its lobbying effort, if you will, to point out the potential that would directly affect members of Congress' constituencies.

Q: Did you find that the Systems Bureau and the Consular Bureau worked together pretty well?

HORSEY-BARR: Certain offices in the Consular Affairs Bureau, primarily the Visa Office. That was where the initial focus was for many years. I think it's only more recently that the passport operation has gotten more automated, and I frankly don't even know what's happened with American Citizen Services in that regard. I cheer led the movement and the positive relationship to Ron for the sake of the Bureau. He really believed in it.

Q: During this '87 to '88 period, who was Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs?

HORSEY-BARR: Joan Clark.

Q: Joan Clark, how did she fit into this?

HORSEY-BARR: She certainly didn't oppose it in any way, because Joan Clark is a very talented person and is known, and I've seen her put her foot down when she wanted to oppose things. But I don't have any recollection of her being actually involved in a big way in this sort of operation.

Q: How did you find the reception of computerization within the Visa Office?

HORSEY-BARR: Most people didn't seem to care. It seems to me that most people did really appreciate the benefits that it could bring. The only part of VO that was automated at that point, if I remember correctly, was the numbers game, the immigrant visa numbers and such. But that was fairly small potatoes in terms of the potential. I think the development of the systems was just too nascent for most people to kind of pull their heads back and get a bit of perspective from the demands of daily work. Most of the work that was being done by the Systems Office, if I remember correctly, at that time was development work as opposed to helping posts and solving and such, so it was a little early in the process for people actually to see in any big way how all these things were really going to make them able to do their job more efficiently and such.

Q: Then in '87 whither?

HORSEY-BARR: I went to the Inspector's Office for a year. For reasons that we needn't go into now, I curtailed and the summer was already upon us and, as we all know, there weren't very many jobs at that point in the assignment cycle. So I went to the Inspector's Office and I was an inspector for a year. From there I went to the Philippines. I enjoyed that, probably in great measure knowing that it was just for year. I think it's very difficult for the Inspector's Office to get people to take a two-year assignment, much less these poor civil servants. Now I think at least a third, if not more, of the staff is civil servants. But the idea of maintaining that kind of a travel schedule on an indefinite basis is just not conducive to getting the best and the brightest civil servants and retaining them, because it's hell on personal life, family life and such. But for me for one year it was very enjoyable and very educational, and I realized that one really had to limit one's expectations of what the inspection process was all about in State and that the main objective really had to be helping people rather than inspecting. One of the inspections that we did was Taiwan and Korea. I was doing the consular work, and the consular section in Korea was quite messed up, and it came up with a number of recommendations which we thought went to the heart of the problem. But the post fought mightily and ultimately won. There it was sort of management shortcomings that then persisted for another three or four years, at least one more consul general, and then I think maybe it was that. In Taiwan it wasn't so much management problems as sort of policy issues involving money because of the special relationship between the United States and Taiwan and the peculiarities of some of the consular operations there. It sort of struck me that in the inspection process when you have an ambassador going out against the Inspector General, it's very hard to effect any meaningful change, and the only way one can do it, I think, was if the people at post wanted to be helped and one could project oneself in the position of being a helper rather than being the inspector. That whole experience was interesting. As I said, we did Korea and Taiwan on one trip, Mexico on another...

Q: Mexico must have been something as far as the huge consular establishment.

HORSEY-BARR: We were in Mexico for three months, and we had, I think, six consular inspectors - maybe it was three. We divided into three teams for the subordinate consulates, and each had one consular person and then somebody of some other description. There were significant problems at one small post that I went to. Overall it was a pretty good operation in Mexico. Then we inspected SP that year, which I was thrilled about because...

Q: SP being...

HORSEY-BARR: The Policy Planning Staff - because it required learning about the different functions that office had had under different Secretaries of State, and it was obvious as one looked at the history of this. At the time we were inspecting SP wasn't particularly doing very much as an office. There were individuals who, because of their background or relationship with Department principals, were very, very heavily involved in key policy issues, but as an office it really wasn't doing very much. So we looked at how in fact the vitality, the relevance, of that office really depended upon the relationship of the head of the office with the Secretary of State. Of course, the time when it was at its best was with George Kennan because of the relationship there. That was fascinating from that perspective. Then the final inspection we did that year was the Economic Bureau. I was with the group that handled aviation and transportation issues, and not being a very strong economic officer, those were the least kind of economic sort of issues. I can't remember anything terribly remarkable about that. But the way it worked, as you know, you go out on these 60-day trips and then you're back here for 30 days writing up the report and briefing or debriefing, and then part of that time you're sort of briefing up for the next trip and then off again for 60 days. It's a very disjointed kind of...

Q: Did you find yourself getting involved, your teams getting involved, in essentially personnel problems and personal problems? I'm thinking of alcoholism, sexual harassment, personality conflicts, that type of thing.

HORSEY-BARR: They were often contributors to the overall, say, poor management situation. I never found they were sort of the key issue. If they were present, they were present as an adjunct to broader difficulties. I don't recall any sexual harassment issues. There were a lot of morale problems; a lot of problems stemming from lack of communication and mutual understanding between the consular section and the rest of the embassy, generally over the question of the amount of immigrant visas, which is fairly standard; a lot of mismanagement, I would say, or poor management or inadequate management in terms of money and use of resources and that sort of thing; but some first-class operations too. I remember going to Aramosea - I can't remember who was principal officer; Bob Kennedy, as a matter of fact - an absolutely first-class operation even though they had much of their consular resource space diverted to narcotics control, narcotics reporting and that sort of thing, but absolutely a first-class operation. I'm trying to think of who the Kennedy was. He's still in the Department.

Q: This was the new Inspector General, wasn't it?

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, a fellow that looks a bit like you.

Q: Funk.

HORSEY-BARR: Sherman Funk, yes, and this was shortly after that new legislation having Inspector Generals report to the White House, the President, rather than to the head of their agency. So the office was much strengthened, figuratively anyway. I didn't frankly see that it changed much.

Q: One of the feelings at the time when this new inspection process came in was that this was more a prosecutorial situation. Particularly they tripled the number of accountants and all of that. As a practical measure it all struck me that the State Department doesn't handle that much in the way of funds. Financial mismanagement is not the major. Financial mismanagement can be in the billions if you're talking about the Bureau of Land Management, but in the State Department it's how you do your job.

HORSEY-BARR: Well, there were a number of things that emanated from that legislation, and it came from where Sherman Funk came from. I'm not sure but whether he was the first outsider to be Inspector General and then came in with this sort of mantle of authority and came from a background such as you've just described. I think there was an effort, or through various actions there certainly was a feeling that that's what the office was more about than it had been in the past. That's also the time, as you pointed out, that they started bringing a lot of civil service people in, primarily accountants and auditors, who had been in other agencies doing financial audits. One of the things that we would have endless arguments about was, first of all, what was the difference between an audit and an inspection and, secondly, whether one could apply the approaches used by financial auditors to what in the Department we call substantive work like political and economic reporting. Many of them had this idea that you could set up a grid and via this grid you could evaluate the effectiveness of, say, a political section, how many contacts, how many phone calls, how many lunches, how many cocktail parties, how many cables sent. I thought it was a bit bizarre, but certainly at that point I hadn't worked overseas as a political or economic officer so I sort of deferred to those that had, and they were just absolutely rabid about the idea that this was a way to measure the effectiveness of a political section. They also applied, or tried to apply, the audit approach to consular work, because while there was limited scope for that in terms of money - it's fairly straightforward as to whether you handle your receipts properly - they thought that was a whole question of numbers. Since Consular Affairs had made its mark in terms of securing resources, because it could quantify the work more than anyplace else in the Department - how many visa applications, how many issued, how many denied, how many requests for passports, how many citizenship cases, how many deaths, or whatever - they had used that as the basis to secure these additional resources on the Hill. And since essentially at that point one was talking about numbers, the financial auditors, who looked at numbers from a different perspective, were particularly inclined to use their auditing skills on consular work, with mixed results but certainly better results overall than trying to apply it to political or economic...

Q: This matrix idea has been tried again and again and again to measure the effectiveness for political and economic reporting. It never really comes out.

HORSEY-BARR: It would be nice. It's nice to think that it would be easy and so therefore it's nice to think that one could do it that way, but I never quite grasped that concept how this is all going to fit together. But then again, I'm not sure if it was at that time that they separated the Inspector's Office into inspections, audits, and whatever it was for prosecutions.

Q: Fairly early on, I think.

HORSEY-BARR: That was earlier than...

Q: No, I think...

HORSEY-BARR: It might have been the same period. And, of course, the people doing prosecutions had to find people to prosecute, whereas before it had only been sort of if it was egregious. Then they would persuade the US Attorney's Office to do something, but now there was an entire office so I think they were sort of looking at things that were bad nonetheless - don't get me wrong - but they weren't as egregious as the cases that had been prosecuted in prior years.

Q: It did seem from what I was hearing that they were looking for things where normally you'd say, "Cut it out, George, and pay up," or "You owe some money here and you shouldn't have done it," and "Pay for that trip or that set of things," and say, "Don't do it again. Sin no more." Now...

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, we had shifted our crunch. It wasn't a pleasant job in that one's relations with colleagues in the Department were not as kind of loose and friendly as they are in other jobs, in part because of this changing attitude and the lack of understanding or comprehension about folks outside the Inspector General's Office as to where it was really going. So there was a certain amount of tension because it was shifting direction. But I found it educational. I don't suppose they say that about every experience. Anyway, that was a one-year assignment, and at the end of it my husband and I were trying to get a tandem assignment overseas, which gets to the whole question of couples, both members of a marriage, if you will, working in the State Department and that difficulty. But we did eventually. I got an assignment to Manila, and our understanding, which turned out to be wrong or changed or what have you, was that a year later he would probably get an assignment there as the political military officer. It didn't work out, but that's what we were aiming for. So after a year in the Inspector's Office, I...

Q: So you went to Manila and you were there from '89 to what, '90?

HORSEY-BARR: '90. When it didn't work out, then I curtailed.

Q: What were you doing in Manila?

HORSEY-BARR: I was on the immigrant visa unit.

Q: The immigrant visa load in Manila renowned.

HORSEY-BARR: Right. Well, at that time it was the highest in the world. It's now been surpassed, I think, by the combined Mexico operations, but it was providing \$7,000,000 or \$8,000,000 a year in fees by itself. It was a pretty depressing operation. There were about 10 junior officers in the immigrant visa section or branch or whatever it was called. They only stayed about three or four months, and then they rotated to other parts of the consular section. So from a management perspective, it was a never-ending process of starting from zero and working up. They were a fine bunch of officers that came through, very impressive, the junior officers coming in, but it was hard to keep them motivated and it was hard to keep myself motivated with this unending stream of people that knew nothing about immigration law or the State Department and really didn't care because they had their eyes fixed on their next, whatever, substantive work or something less of a dronish kind of existence. That was a difficult time between the United States and the Soviets. Of course, Marcos was gone, but there was a lot of anti-American feeling and there were several coup attempts during the year. Every month something would happen. There was either a coup or a typhoon or flood or earthquake or volcano exploding. It seemed like every month with some regularity there was some major issue, which was interesting in itself, of course, but, speaking as the manager of this large operation, made it that much more difficult to keep up. I remember one of the constant refrains of Washington was, "You've got to use those numbers. You've got to use those numbers. How come you can't use those numbers?"

Q: These were numbers allocated to...

HORSEY-BARR: Number for immigration to the United States. Of course, every time we had one of these events and shut down for a week, it made the process of churning these out with these young folks, who were willing but not terribly able given their status at a new post, that much more difficult. The other thing I found interesting, before we move on to other things, as the manager of that operation was just how many links there are between the Filipino community in the Philippines and folks back here. I have never in my whole life seen as many unification cases. I would have 20 or 30 a day coming in.

Q: I'm not aware of a Philippine community here in Washington. There may be one.

HORSEY-BARR: Oh, but there is, and there are a number of restaurants, not that I frequent them. Filipino food is not amongst my choices, but there are, and most of the Filipino community here in Washington, I don't think they live as a community. You have the Latinos or you have Salvadorans, Hondurans, what have you, on Kalorama Road, Adams Morgan; out here in Arlington we have Vietnamese now. I don't think the Filipinos live as a community the way other immigrant groups in the Washington DC area do, but they are here in sufficient numbers to justify or support these various Filipino restaurants that we know of here, particularly in Virginia.

Q: What about the immigrant visa process? Non-immigrant, one knows about the problem of people trying to circumvent it, but what about the immigrant process? What were your problems there?

HORSEY-BARR: Documentary problems. You could not trust any document in the Philippines at all. They're great forgers; they were really very good. It happened in so many of these operations where you have fraud. It really extends from a cultural difference or a different cultural perspective than the prevailing United States cultural perspective. Nothing really wrong started it, there's nothing wrong with using whatever means available to one to get into the United States. So you couldn't trust the written document, and you really couldn't trust the verbal document either, the oral document, so you just kind of went on gut feeling or you threw up your hands. If it didn't look that bad, you went ahead. It did raise, particularly on the non-immigrant visa side, the whole question of just how you justify your decision when you're doing it basically on a gut feeling as opposed to anything more tangible, anything you could really point to judge your decision.

Q: Well, we had our problems with officers in Manila dealing with visa - I'm talking about up to the consul general level up and down - because of favoritism, fraud, sexual favors, what have you.

HORSEY-BARR: That whole incident that I'm thinking of happened before I was there, just before this, so it was still fresh in people's minds.

Q: But it happened...

HORSEY-BARR: Probably more than once, probably twice that I can think of. It may have happened more times, but I can think of two instances. But, you see, I think that comes from one of the real dangers of consular work, which is to take oneself too seriously and one's authority and such. I remember as a junior officer it's very easy to let oneself think that all this attention is because of oneself as opposed to one's position, and that's the difficulty, the danger, for people new to the system. Now, one would think that somebody who'd been around and reached a rank equivalent to consul general in a big place like Manila would have acquired sufficient maturity to recognize that, but that is the same sort of danger. Actually I think it's a bit of a danger with respect to the Foreign Service too. I think a lot of people have difficulty when they retire from the Foreign Service because of all this attention that they get, especially if you're a consular officer, of course. Then it starts at the very junior levels. But even in other fields, the United States is a big player most places, and if you're representing the embassy, much less if you have visas to dispose of, you are a big fish in a small pond. I think it makes for difficulty when people retire, especially for a lot of people who've been ambassador. When you go off and be an ambassador, maybe, and then after retirement nobody calls and nobody's interested in you because you no longer have whatever it was people thought you had before. The fact that they were interested in you is really perhaps that they plus the sort of the cultural difference and what gets people into trouble in our line of work.

Q: And the Philippines, of course, is the preeminent case. I was counselor general in Seoul about 10 years before this, and that problem was there almost in the same magnitude. There was lots of fraud. I was always worried about corruption.

HORSEY-BARR: Good thing to be worried about. You know, when you have such a difference in the standard of living and at least in the case of the Philippines you have a large community in the United States. So, you have enough contact that you have people in the Philippines who have a fairly good idea of what it is like here, what the opportunities are to work and that sort of thing. And so, I suspect until recently there was less of that.

Q: I take it, it was not with unhappiness that you decided to curtail and go somewhere else.

HORSEY-BARR: Oh, no, no, no, not unhappiness about that at all. It was, in fact, the worst post that I had, the worse assignment that I had, professionally as well as personally. Manila was a dreadful place to live in those days, and people that were there at the time that had been there in earlier years certainly agreed with that.

Q: What was the problem?

HORSEY-BARR: I think it was this unrest, whether it came from acts of God or from the government or acts of the revolutionaries. That was fairly constant, and it was fairly clear that, if you keep the car out, you really kind of worry and you just parked it wherever. You did worry about when you came back was there going to be a bomb stuck under there. That was not an insignificant concern. Manila also as a city, I find, is the most unattractive I've seen, unattractive. It's all concrete. I guess it was just leveled in the war, so there's very little of old historic value, and it has been built up and it's a great example of a concrete jungle, and it's not attractive, whatever light color or different color it's all sort of a gray concrete. Maybe that's the cheapest concrete; I have no idea. There are no trees, no grass - in a couple residential, the upper-class residential areas, yes, but I'm speaking of the city as a city more than the residential areas. And air pollution was a big factor, noise pollution. The bay was totally polluted. And it took hours; traffic was just incredible. I lived about five miles from the embassy; if I left at seven, I could be there in 10 minutes. If I left at 7:15 or 7:20 it would take me an hour; to get out of town it would take easily an hour and half of stop-and-go traffic. There were dreadful fumes. It is just not a very livable city, and to get out of it was very difficult. I spent a lot of time going up to Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base, couple of years before the base negotiations brought about their closure. And that was heavenly. I can remember driving with my husband and we were going to Subic Bay and we drove through the gates of Subic Bay and he said, "Listen. The birds are singing in English." "The birds, to begin with, the birds, and they're singing! And there's grass and, look, there's a monkey over there." There's a great poverty, how this destroyed everything of beauty that Manila might have had, with the war and then the poverty, that Manila might have had to offer. Well, no, I was quite happy to leave.

Q: Well, in 1990 where'd you go?

HORSEY-BARR: I went back to Honduras.

Q: And you were in Honduras from 1990 to...

HORSEY-BARR: ...to '92.

Q: What were you doing?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, I had two jobs. The ambassador there at the time was a fellow, Chris Arcos, who was a USIA officer, had been public affairs officer when we were there the first time, and he had two senior jobs and could not fill them, and that's how he got out of Manila. One of the jobs was political counselor, and the other job was what they called regional affairs coordinator or such. Honduras was the only place in Central America that had not or was not experiencing civil war. Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua- and so a lot of the regional activities were based there. There were a lot of bilateral activities based there, too. He wanted me to be political counselor and my husband to be the regional affairs counselor because he, my husband, had worked with the Contras for many years, both in Honduras before as well as in Washington, and it made sense. Unfortunately the Department wouldn't let him do that because they were afraid of being sued by my husband, who was political officer and therefore rightly in their view should be the political counselor as opposed to me. But he didn't want to be political counselor. The Department would not assign us to the jobs we and the ambassador wanted to go to, so we went there assigned by the Department as the Department saw fit and then the ambassador detailed us into each other's jobs, and there is this obscure provision we found whereby an ambassador can do that for up to a year. So at the end of the first year we went on holiday and then he did it again, infuriating the Department but accomplishing his purposes, with which we were quite comfortable anyway. So in the beginning before we figured this out, I was the regional affairs person and then we switched over when we figured out the loophole.

Q: Let's talk a little about Honduras in '90 to '92. What was the situation there government and American interests?

HORSEY-BARR: They had their third or fourth elected president at that time. They were sort of a shining star in terms of democracy, a peaceful-transition democracy, and transition from one party to another and all that sort of thing. In fact it was skin deep and isn't much better now, but of course one has to do what the other countries would want it too. It was in fact much better. We had poured a lot of money into Honduras during the '80s, and I don't know to what extent that kept it stable, probably a fair amount, but Honduras doesn't have the great divisions, great social and economic divisions, that most of the other countries in Central America have. So, the really difficult part about Honduras in '90 to '92 was that it was rapidly vanishing from the scope. The embassy was drawing down. The money was dropping off. Peace was springing up in other countries in Central America. So Honduras was losing its interest to the United States, and I think for the ambassador that was a difficult process to manage because it is fairly easy to grow but it's only a big person that can be honest about cutting staff, resources and what have you when the political situation had changed. So it was reverting to being a backwater that it has been for most of its history. Most of the regional job had three aspects: one was the Contras, one was narcotics, and the third was refugees. The first and third were wind-up operations, and the narcotics was of course growing because Honduras hadn't had the conflict and didn't have the organization of the other countries and was missing the money that had been flowing in from the United States, was ripe for traffickers to use and was a growing transit point for narcotics. It was very different being there in those years than early in the '80s and kind of a disappointment because, of course, in the early '80s one was at the center of the foreign policy focus and certainly from '90 to '92 one wasn't. Honduras doesn't have that much to offer in terms of places to visit, things to do. It has always been sort of a backwater, backward water for the Spaniards, backwater in the 9th century, backwater in the 20th century. So if you don't have a really demanding job, it was sort of a challenge to find things to do to...

Q: How did you work as a political officer? What did you do?

HORSEY-BARR: We focused on human rights at that point. People were very open, very pro-American in Honduras, so there was absolutely no trouble finding people to talk to. That was a period of time in which the Department was very interested in Honduras. The military was, as we were, the Honduran military was downsizing, was being forced to downsize, and this was really the one element of potential instability. I mention it because the military was the source of most of the human rights violations there, and the police was part of the military. As the United States we were beginning to concentrate on human rights violations in Honduras, but it was difficult because, I think - and there are different points of view on this - my view is that they did exist in the '80s in a big way, and because we had other priorities, we in fact didn't pay attention to them, which happens a lot. What is the greater priority for the United States in situation X, Y, Z? Human rights in the '80s were not going to be the biggest priority.

Q: Could you explain in the Honduran context what were the problems in human rights?

HORSEY-BARR: Disappearances, indefinite jail tenures, torture, forced conscription; the military essentially was the law of the land. In many developing countries, at least in Latin America, in the absence of a strong civilian democratic government and not just presidency but regional representation, legislature and such, once one gets out of the capital, the only presence is the military - taking people's land, raping women so as to buy their acquiescence, the military looking to agriculture, the military looking to banking.

Q: How about Indians? One hears in Nicaragua of the Miskito Indians.

HORSEY-BARR: Right, there are in Honduras, too, on the Caribbean coast border with Nicaragua, but in Honduras the population is much more mixed, it's a much browner population overall than in Nicaragua, Salvador, or Guatemala. In those countries where you had greater wealth you also have a much greater division between the whites and the browns. In Honduras there was no money and very few people other than of mixed race, I mean even in the Middle East Palestinians, Christians, they all were white, white, white. Everybody there was sort of different shades of brown. The military is an interesting institution because, while people who are focused on Central America consider mainly its limitations and shortcomings that we were talking about in terms of human rights, it also was the one vehicle for social advancements and economic advancements for the lower economic classes. Anybody could get into the military, and if you had the smarts, that was the way, that was upward mobility. Business was not, government was not. The military served an important function in that way. But Honduras again, as I said, doesn't have Indian population that the other countries do, but there are some, and the Garifunas in which are descendants of blacks from the West Indies who live along the coast.

Q: Probably came over from Belize.

HORSEY-BARR: They didn't come from Belize; they came from St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and they live on the coast and they speak their own language. Some speak English; very few speak Spanish. And then, of course, the islands of Honduras are populated by former pirate-type people, and they are white but they're like the whites you find in the Chesapeake Bay, speak very interesting English, very interesting accent and vocabulary in English, and have absolutely nothing to do with the mainland of Honduras except they are part of the country. Many of them, most of them, speak Spanish, and most Hondurans don't speak English. Those sort of examples are really small in terms of the overall population.

Q: Did you have missionaries and if so, how did they fit in from your perspective?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, we talked about deliberation theology business the other time. Most of them were doing missionary work, but I would say that the most significant religious operators were Protestant. In fact, the growth of the Protestant sects, if you will, in Central America was really very obvious in Honduras, and the Catholic Church just had not delivered, and what was not delivered to the people, the spiritual or personal support that they looked to, and the growth of Angelical movements in Honduras was phenomenal. I was always surprised to see the Mormons there, they were there in a big way, Protestants. Mennonites were there, but the big ones were the Evangelicals, and the population responded positively.

Q: Did they have an agenda other than conversion?

HORSEY-BARR: Not that I knew of.

Q: So you weren't finding them sort of aligning themselves so there really wasn't the downtrodden that there might be in other places.

HORSEY-BARR: Well, by our terms certainly would be downtrodden, but there wasn't the contrast between the downtrodden, those that have and those that don't have, and the contrast was much less significant because there just wasn't ever any money in Honduras. What money there was, was generally controlled by the American Banana Company. There were a number of people that had money, probably had millions of dollars, but it was only a handful as opposed to Nicaragua, Salvador and Guatemala. They don't have the wherewithal to make more money, or at least not the method we use.

Q: How did you find the press there?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, they called themselves independent but they were very party affiliated, and the difference between the political parties was sort of hard to discern. It was mainly based on family, family affiliation.

Q: Are political interests relevant or diminishing?

HORSEY-BARR: Stability. Keep 'em quiet.

Q: Keep 'em quiet.

HORSEY-BARR: Keep 'em quiet and pull out, and have them adjust quietly to our pull-out essentially. But anyway, let's do more next time.

Q: That's no problem. This time I think in a way we've almost covered Honduras, haven't we?

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, I think so. Maybe something will come to mind.

Q: Think of something. Other than that we'll move on. We've come to '92, but there may be something more about Honduras when you think about it.

HORSEY-BARR: Right, we'll see if there's anything more about Honduras.

Q: Today is the 25th of August 2000. Sarah, in 1992 whither and what?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, in 1992 it was time to move on. Actually I hadn't been in Honduras two years even, but I was bidding and I got selected for the job of DCM at the US mission to the OAS here in Washington, and everybody thought that was a very good opportunity and so did I and so I took it. So I left Honduras in April, left my husband there. One of the conditions was that he would stay until August so that I could get released early. So I left and came back to Washington into the mission to the OAS, and I was the deputy for Luigi R. Einaudi who, you may know, is career State Department person but not a Foreign Service Officer. He came from RAND in the civil service, and he was at the time ambassador to the OAS.

Q: So you were doing this from '92 to when?

HORSEY-BARR: I did it first from '92 until about July of '95, and then I went to senior seminar and then another job, and I was recalled back to the mission in January of '97 and spent another year till the summer of '98, and then I went off and headed the Pan American Development Foundation, which is associated, of course, with the OAS.

Q: We'll stick to the '93-'95 period. Could you tell me how the OAS was seen sort of from the State Department eyes in this particular period?

HORSEY-BARR: It was a very good period for the OAS. The OAS historically has been stronger or weaker, I think, depending on the state of US relations with the hemisphere, Western Hemisphere, and of course that is dictated by how unilateralist we are at the particular time and how much interest there is in the hemisphere. In 1992 a couple events had preceded it which made for a very high-level interest in the OAS. First of all, Central American wars of the 1980s meant that attention was still, let's say, higher than normal in the Western Hemisphere. Secondly, the Bush Administration had been very clear that it wanted to approach problems multilaterally. So with the interest in the Western Hemisphere and the multilateral emphasis on foreign policy, there tended to be in the United States a special focus on the OAS. In addition - well, maybe partly related to those first two things - in 1990 the OAS had taken a decision that any interruption of the democratic order would be grounds for action. Of course, that whole principle of democracy being a sine qua non because of membership in OAS had been there from the very beginning, but it had never really been adhered to.

Q: For most of the time we're talking about, it had been run by dictators.

HORSEY-BARR: Anyway, in 1990 they had taken this decision that had invoked this resolution called 1080, the number that was given to it. They had used that resolution twice already when I came in April, once against Haiti when President Aristide was overthrown, and already they invoked it against President Fujimori for his actions in Peru. So, it was a very exciting time to be there. The OAS really was the focus of US policy makers. Probably because of that it was also the focus of a number of other important countries' foreign policy, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Canada - Canada had just joined - and they all had very good missions' ambassadors. As happens so often, the policy is made by people on the ground and how effective they are: smart, capable, and such. There was a good bunch of key country ambassadors and missions that were very well prepared.

Q: Why hadn't Canada been a member before, and why did it become a member at this time?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, they hadn't been a member before because, much like the United States - in fact, more so - Canada's focus had always been towards Europe, Great Britain and Europe, and they had never taken any steps to become members. I think they were changing as they saw more and more trade with the hemisphere developing as important...

Q: You're talking now about the time of the North American Free Trade Agreement and things were beginning to come together there.

HORSEY-BARR: That's right, and Canada was beginning to look a little more, a lot more, towards this hemisphere because of the importance economically, and I think politically too. The Cuba issue, I don't know if it factored in Canadian thinking, but I wouldn't be surprised if it did, if they saw a way to make a mark for themselves with their sort of peace-loving ways, that Canada is famed for in terms of brokering a deal between the United States and Cuba. None of that came to pass, but you can see both politically and economically, and the Canadians often do operate in the OAS as a counterweight to the United States, very much interested in showing that they are not necessarily as one with the United States. And, of course they've been in the same positions as the United States has on issues. Canada had joined very recently; 1990 I think it was, and they were the newcomer, very interested and very active in the bureaucratic routine. So it was a very exciting time to be at the OAS, and the United States emphasis was on strengthening the role of that organization in terms of consolidating democracy in the hemisphere. It was the first time probably ever that the countries of the hemisphere had democratically elected governments, except Cuba of course; Cuba is still suspended from the OAS. It was an exciting time to be there, much as Central America had been exciting time, because it was so much the center of policy. It was an exciting time to be at the OAS because things were happening and there was an opportunity to do things.

Q: You arrived during the Bush administration. Was there a trust as far as the OAS was concerned that the Organization of American States under the Bush administration, when the Clinton administration came in was changed at all?

HORSEY-BARR: I would say so, although it didn't become apparent to me right away. When Clinton came in, we got a new ambassador to the OAS, Hattie Babbitt, a political appointee and very closely connected with the Administration, especially with the Vice President, who had come out of NDI, the National Democratic Institute, and had particular interest in human rights and the rule of law. Because of her interest...

Q: What was her name again?

HORSEY-BARR: Hattie Babbitt, Harriet Babbitt. In fact, she's the deputy administrator in AID right now. She moved after four or five years, she moved over there. Her interest and her connections made the attention the OAS was getting probably stronger than it would have otherwise been in the first Clinton term and that was very beneficial for the Organization and, I think, for the hemisphere because we were able to do things, say things, that, had we had a career person, probably we would not have been able to do. In that sense it was a very good use of a political appointee. In my view she was a very good political appointee. But the down side of that from my perspective, of course, is that I didn't realize until fairly well into the second Clinton term just how little the Clinton Administration really felt about foreign policy at all, much less the hemisphere. So that was rather a rude awakening. Because of the connections we had there in the OAS, we were able to get involvement, action, decisions on things that affected the OAS, that the rest of the people doing policy in Latin America couldn't really get. That sort of deluded me into thinking that there really was an active group in foreign policy...

Q: Alec Watson was the Assistant Secretary for part of that time.

HORSEY-BARR: For part of the time, yes, and then, of course, he left and went to the Nature Conservancy. The first Assistant Secretary when I arrived, I think, was Bernie Aaronson, and then Alec Watson and then at the end Jeff David Albert. There was a lot going on in the hemisphere and I think the United States started pulling back. It's a phenomenon that one sees a lot vis-à-vis the region, that when things are going well or moderately well, seemingly in the right direction if not well in and of itself, we didn't, and then when we're right back to pay attention again when catastrophes tend to happen.

Q: Let's take the end of the Bush time. Anything particular that was absorbing your attention at that point?

HORSEY-BARR: There are a couple of incidents that I can remember. First of all, there was the Fujimori problem.

Q: Could you explain what that was?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, Fujimori essentially closed down the legislative and judicial branches in, I think, April...

Q: This was in Chile.

HORSEY-BARR: No, it was in Peru.

Q: I mean Peru, yes.

HORSEY-BARR: ...leaving the president, and still is. So the OAS called him to task and said that this was in fact an interruption of democratic order, which was an interesting position because before that time one essentially had talked about the sort of presidential positions and a coup to that position the interruption of the democratic order and hadn't even stopped to think about the legislative branch. And Fujimori wanted to close it down, and so that was another first step on the road to strengthening democracy that the legislators operated independently. Fujimori engineered the so-called the *alta volta*, the sort of self coup. He remained in power and he in fact shut down the legislature. That was interesting from the perspective of working in the OAS because he did back down. The Organization was probably not as strong against him and his actions as it should have been, because over the years we're seeing him grasping more and more power and most recently this spring. Who knows whether that will come to pass as the Organization is really getting stronger.

Q: If the Organization says you're a bad boy, then what do they do?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, that's quite a question, because, unlike the United Nations which has the Security Council which, for example, can impose sanctions, everything in the OAS is voluntary, and its decisions are reached by consensus. Many people criticize the Organization for that. It requires such a lower threshold of decision making in order to get them to a consensus. Other people, on the other hand, say that, despite that, the decisions end up being much stronger once they are made. States can take their pick on that. But the question also goes to the way Peru was handled in the time of the democracy period, handled as opposed to the way the problems of democracy in Haiti were handled. And the latter instance, Haiti, we, the Organization, much with United States' assistance, backed the embargo, which was more or less effective. But nonetheless there was this action taken to try and bring the perpetrators of this coup to their knees. In the case of Peru no such action was taken, and there was much criticism by the Caribbean nations that the extreme use of this tool would only be directed against people of color. The reason, of course, it wasn't directed against Fujimori was because he was one of the majority in the Organization, and that had some serious repercussions thereafter because the voting in the OAS is one-vote/one-state, population has nothing to do with it, so Brazil has the same voting voice as St. Kitts which is itself rather peculiar. But in the event that tools such as the embargo which have only been used once to my knowledge - are not effective, the only thing the Organization has is moral suasion. If one can get a solid consensus on a point, that's not insignificant, as long as, of course, there are some messages, if you will, of democracy and one can build up pressure that way. But it's a peculiar organization in many respects.

Q: As DCM, again under Einaudi and the Bush Administration, how did you operate?

HORSEY-BARR: Luigi is a brilliant man politically but has little interest or inclination for management organizations but brilliant from a strategic perspective, and very highly knowledgeable about the hemisphere and the OAS itself. So the way we divided things was you would think up a great plan and then I would marshal the troops and what have you and executive it, which was, I found, a splendid way to proceed because it plays to his strength and it plays to my strength. We were very fluid. I think we got a lot of things done, and for me, particularly since I didn't know the OAS when I took the job, it was a great learning experience to be exposed to his knowledge and his strategizing. Now, with Hattie Babbitt we worked a little differently in that she didn't want to be bothered with marshaling the troops but would on issues of very important stability, and issues of human rights. At that point she came in January of '93. She would take those issues, and then I would choose a couple of issues, and then we kind of go both ahead and I would check with her and such. But then I had under my own control specific issues.

Q: Let's take an issue and what would you do, marshalling the troops, going ahead...

HORSEY-BARR: For example, one of the things that was very important right when she came in was the election of the successor Secretary General. Secretaries General in the OAS are elected every five years, and the election was coming up. I can't remember now if it was in '93 or '94. We actually sat down, looked over the various candidates, figured out which the United States could support politically and practically, which one we could give our bid. Then she developed this very carefully thought-out plan about how we were going to go about persuading other countries to support the candidate we supported without showing our cards to the others. Well, everybody knew who we were supporting in the end, so it's no big deal at this point in time. Now, she marshaled troops, if you will, on that issue and did so very effectively, as we sort of looked at each country and figured out how to get that country to come to the same conclusion that we have. In some cases it involved trips to the capital; in other cases it involved much more sort of brass tact discussions: "What will it take to get your vote?" I found that very interesting because I'd never been involved in an election campaign of any sort, and I suppose that's much the way in campaigns, be they local, regional, provincial, national, international, that's the way one approaches it. Of course, she had background in it since her husband had run for office. He had been elected governor of Arizona and had run unsuccessfully as the Democratic candidate...

Q: Lewis Babbitt

HORSEY-BARR: Lewis Babbitt.

Q: He was Secretary of the Interior...

HORSEY-BARR: And he's now Secretary of the Interior, yes. So she had had, I presume, that sort of exposure. In any case, my opinion, watching this thing unfold, was that she certainly brought to the process knowledge and skills about how to go about it. Frankly I wouldn't have had a clue. So that's one issue. Subsequently another issue that I actually handled was the combined budgetary and political aspects. As you may remember, after the Central American war finished, because of the reduced interest by the United States and the hemisphere, we were slashing AID budgets. In fact the budget of the OAS was not actually slashed; we managed to keep it on a straight line. We weren't getting the increases that we had been getting in previous years when money was not a big concern. I think the deficit was a big part of all that too now that I think back to it. Anyway, so the idea was how could we get the Organization to waste less money and shift its substantive focus to areas of concern to us. Of course, the whole democracy consolidation was one of our issues, areas of interest, and another one was the Clinton administration's concern with the environment, and the third one I can't remember. So we had three principal areas that we wanted the Organization to spend more time and more money on. That was one of the issues that I had, and I got myself elected chair of the Budget Committee, and then led the Budget Committee, which consisted of all states who wanted to participate, led those representatives through a process whereby we would get the increases that we were looking for. It was a very long, torturous process, because it was mixed up in this huge personnel suit by the employees of the OAS against organization for failure to give salary increases and such over the years, but the bill for that came to millions of dollars and so that was mixed in. The first year we managed to get the budgetary increase in the substantive areas that we wanted by persuading the other countries to go along with us. We were not able to solve that personnel suit, that litigation, until a year later, but we managed to do that without incurring additional financial problems. The reason costs were so important was that the United States paid 59.6, 60 percent essentially, of the budget, so that kind of invoked a lot of Congressional oversight, not just because it's such a large percentage but because the sums of money actually started to be significant in terms of the results.

Q: When you're talking about money, what does the money do?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, that's a good question. The Congress asked that too. For the most part, the OAS pays salaries and it pays for programs in democracies, for example, they have seminars, that they're now doing by sub-region, on how to have an election, how to register people to vote, how to run a campaign, how to get out the vote, what are the standards that should be applied to the judicial branch, things that go to strengthen the democratic air and essentially for many of the countries building awareness of how it works elsewhere, because for many of the countries democracy is so shallow and the idea that you have elections and you have a democracy is really elementary. So the idea was to bring those groups and individuals along in countries that had not had exposure to this so that they would be putting those demands on their on society for aspects of political life that they hadn't been exposed to. Now, for example the environment, we again would fund workshops and seminars with counterparts here in the United States, be they national or state or local or government agencies or NGOs, so that people would again see how it's possible to bring pressure to make change and conserve their environment.

Q: I think that being in Washington and being able to draw on the political process here including NGOs was a great asset.

HORSEY-BARR: Absolutely. Although we often found that the more effective way to go about was to have countries other than the United States involved in this sharing. The United States and the Western Hemisphere is viewed as sort of god like and devil like at the same time. So the same lesson imparted by, if you will, one of their own would be much better received frequently than imparted by an American whoever.

Q: A little too much like lecturing to them.

HORSEY-BARR: Right, exactly, and so we would often fund exchanges between, for example, Caribbean and South American. One of the programs we were working on on the environment was to have the Caribbean folks instruct or share with Central Americans how they use natural resources for the tourist trade, thereby getting income for lower-income-level folks to sort of come up the economic ladder while at the same time conserving environmental aspects of the tourist industry. That worked out very nicely, because of course the Caribbeans have been doing that for years for tourists coming in. Central Americans were just starting with the advent of ecotourism, and so there was something they could share profitably, and it wasn't the United States coming in in its sort of bromide approach.

Q: I would think in the OAS - again, I've never served in Latin America, but just looking at it - I would think there would be a group of prima donnas - and I consider the United States to be obviously one of them - Mexico, Brazil and perhaps Canada, trotting on the stage, but in a way all of them wanted to a certain extent put down the United States.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes. Well, you've touched on a couple of things. First of all, there's a very different view of what the OAS should do depending on their internal political philosophy. The United States, for example, goes fairly strictly by the charter, democracy, human rights, and what have you, and that's what the OAS should be about. Now, countries like Mexico - I guess is the classic one - will say, "Well, that's all very well and good, but overriding in any sort of democracy you might have a tendency for external meddling." It's a whole principle of sovereignty and nonintervention. "So we can talk about it, but I don't want this organization doing anything or saying anything about what goes on within my borders, because you shouldn't be interfering. So you can make general platitude kind of pronouncements, but we're not going to do anything." Then you have the sort of Caribbean group, most of which became independent and therefore were able to join the OAS only in the last '60s and '70s, and they look to the OAS primarily as a source of financial assistance because, again, the United States thinks primarily of its political arm but it also has a technical assistance and development arm, and so the Caribbeans, the small countries, and some of the small Latin ones too, Paraguay, Bolivia and such, traditionally have thought of it primarily in terms of "How much money can you give me?" or the complement of bilateral assistance in the embassies. So you do have all these different sort of agendas going in the place, which is why it's often very difficult to get people to pay attention. If one country wants to accomplish something on the political level, oftentimes just two or three countries opposing, if they're willing to be engaged in their opposition, are enough to squash the whole deal because there are so many nonplayers, if you will. At the same time that very phenomenon, if you can get four or five countries to really sort of do a slam-dunk and you're sure that there isn't anybody in strong opposition, you can get something agreed to. But it makes it very difficult. I never quite understood and I used to question my Mexican and Brazilian particular colleagues about what struck me as rather unusual, anomalous kind of behavior, because with the emphasis on nonintervention, it always seemed to me that those countries who cared about that were sort of inviting the United States to go at it alone. If I had been in their shoes, I would have done everything I could to rope the United States into this OAS and at least have some semblance that something was happening or whatever to preclude the United States saying, "The hell with it. We'll just go in like we did in the Dominican Republic." Well, we did get our way elsewhere.

Q: Eventually, after the fact.

HORSEY-BARR: So let me think of another example. I can't think of one of the top of my head now. So as to preclude our going at things unilaterally, and yet many times they would just dig in their heels, and maybe they had a better reading than I of what the United States would really do in the end. I think the United States would have been prepared - that's an interesting question - I think it would have been prepared to go alone on Haiti, because during the coup or after, the year following the coup, in 1992, I guess it was, or '91, the domestic political impact of all the refugees streaming out from Haiti...

Q: Our officers being gored.

HORSEY-BARR: ...our officers being gored in a bad way. Florida is a really important state for elections, for presidential elections, so I suppose that we would have gone along on Haiti if we hadn't been successful in the OAS, and being successful in the OAS was sort of the precondition for going to the United Nations. So when we were pulling out of the OAS, then that gate sort of opened the door to go into the United Nations.

Q: Before we move to the Haiti situation, because this is one of the major ones, could you give me a feel for dealing, say, with some of the nationalities and personalities that you were dealing with, the Mexicans, the Brazilians maybe, some of the Jamaicans and the others?

HORSEY-BARR: Sure. Well, let's start with the Mexicans, their being such close neighbors. The Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs is dominated - it may be changing now; it's hard to say now with President Fox having been elected; well, of course, he hasn't taken office - was traditionally dominated by old-line folks who espouse, I guess, the original tenets of the principal Mexican political party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party. Mexico, I think, has - the Institutional Revolutionary Party - maintained its grip and, therefore, its tradition of controlling Mexico for the last 70 or 80 years, I think in great measure by copying revolution and antagonism in foreign policy while copying socialism, rather corrupt socialism, domestically. So Mexico as an international organization, or at least in the OAS, would not want any focus on its internal affairs, as I mentioned earlier, and would take very extreme positions on external matters. Mexico was very difficult to deal with in the OAS, and we sort of had the conclusion, or the staff concluded, that Mexico really wasn't interested in the OAS doing anything. That made sense because they wouldn't want OAS to do anything about, even look at, what was happening domestically in Mexico. The Mexicans were very difficult at that time.

Q: While we're talking about Mexico - we talked about Fujimori - was it sort of a no-no to question whether Mexico was a democracy or not?

HORSEY-BARR: Oh, yes. In fact, when I stayed there in '92, you certainly wouldn't do that. Moreover, to tell you how far the organization came within, say, a period of five years, or three or four years, you would never mention the word 'corruption' because 'corruption' implied that you were looking within somebody's national borders. I think it was in '95 we were able to get a code of conduct on the question of corruption, which then served as a model for other codes. So the first one actually happened in the OAS. It was an extraordinary thing, I thought, that these countries would agree to have it talked about. Now, it didn't point a finger at any particular country, but at least it talked about corruption and how the absence of it and things that could be done were vital for a sound democratic system.

Q: In Mexico I - from just talking to people - had the feeling that the foreign ministry was sort of staffed by sort of quite extreme left-wing intellectuals, sort of the extreme left wing of the French Socialist Party, that type of people, and this is where they were sort of kept, it was their playpen.

HORSEY-BARR: It was their playpen, and it didn't really make any difference to Mexico, because they could say what they want and it was about foreign affairs, it was about Cuba, it was about the United States. They had no relevance to what was going inside of Mexico except that it functioned as a safety valve so that the whole rah-rah and their satisfaction of what was going on domestically was vented for the benefit of the population via this extreme behavior in foreign affairs. That's the way I saw it. Now, Brazil is different. Brazil shared with Mexico a lot of this sovereignty and nonintervention, but it never seemed quite as rabid. Brazilian diplomats are probably the best I've ever run into.

Q: This is something I've heard again and again.

HORSEY-BARR: Very, very sharp and very well trained, meticulous, whereas the Mexicans were more just sort of lax. The Brazilians were incredibly disciplined. You knew that anything you said was back in Brasilia in a matter of hours. We would have it coming back time and time again. I respected that a lot. I don't think that they really viewed foreign policy in the same way. They just didn't have that sort of a balance.

Q: Well, they weren't trying to prove something.

HORSEY-BARR: No, Brazil thinks it's a real country. It is a real country, and it doesn't have any hang-ups really as far as the United States is concerned.

Q: As contrasted to Canada.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes. Now, Canada had just joined. I wish I could remember the exact date, but anyway in the 90's. The ambassador there in '92 and everybody in that mission was the first sort of assignment. In that sort of set of assignment, the Canadians were essentially feeling their way. Their main thing was the money. "If we're going to stay here, we need to see how the money is being used." That refrain, of course, continued but even later, but then more in terms of interest in specific political issues and economic issues as well. In the beginning the Canadians were without hang-ups. They knew they were the new kid on the block, they were learning the system, they were learning the hang-ups there, and the main thing was the money. Over time, I'd say into the next set of assignments, they became much more vocal, more professional but that's obvious, more interested in their own agenda as separate from the United States, and more interested across the board in trying to show to some extent that they were really the hope for the hemisphere. In fact, the culmination of that so far has been this year that virtually every hemispheric meeting has taken place in Canada in one city or another. They volunteered to do everything. It's not an insignificant expense to host one of these international meetings. They tried outside of the OAS to take the lead in the hemisphere and in fixing things with Fidel and had gotten rather badly burned at that. I would say the OAS is better for their presence than not. The OAS is so strained because when the U.S. pays 60 percent of the bill, it's very hard, almost impossible, not to be the heavyweight, and people know it. It's a rather sick kind of situation if one comes from the premise of you've got 34 independent and equally sovereign states and then one of them is paying 60 percent of the bill, so you have the Canadians. Now, the Caribbean was divided up. You have the big countries, Jamaica, Trinidad - what else do we have out there? Cuba of course is suspended. I think Jamaica and Trinidad, the Dominican Republic. Let me talk about the Dominican Republic, because that was a real interesting example. President Balaguer had been in power for God knows how many years in the Dominican Republic. During the course of my tenure in the OAS, I think he withdrew. I don't think he ran for office, but his candidate was defeated and there was a new administration after many, many years in the Dominican Republic. That was fascinating in terms of watching how a country's policies could just change overnight. So much of what the previous ambassador had done at the OAS was clearly sort of how much he could get away with on knowing Balaguer's position and knowing that Balaguer was old, sick blind, what have you. Then you get this new young administration in the Dominican Republic at least nominally interested in democracy and doing things right, and you could just see the Dominican Republic's position on issues go from black to white. It was interesting. It doesn't happen with the United States. Our policies remain more or less consistent. I don't know if it's the size of the country or the extremeness of President Balaguer. Jamaica and Trinidad were the first countries in the Caribbean, English-speaking Caribbean countries, to join OAS. They had a larger mission to the OAS, and they were, therefore, more prepared. To be on top of issues in a multilateral organization required a fair amount of time and, therefore, staff. So with the little missions - little like two or three people would do - they'd just write off issues and just not pay any attention. The larger ones, of course, could have help studying all of them and working those issues. So Jamaica and Trinidad often proved to be the leaders, so whatever positions they took, the littler countries would follow because they just assumed they had some common interests and they didn't have the time. It was difficult for the United States operating in a multilateral environment in the western hemisphere. And the relationships between the United States and virtually everyone in the Western Hemisphere has been so much historically, well when we cared. We would say. "Jump," and the response is "How high?" not whether you jump or not, and you just didn't see that at this time in a multilateral organization. I think that made it very difficult for the United States. I remember one Assistant Secretary when one of the many times Peru flared up at the OAS, who was just beside himself with ire, and I remember him just screaming at me, "What do you mean you can't get them to adopt" whatever it was we wanted on that particular day?" I would say, "There are 34 countries, and these five aren't going to do it and, therefore, the rest are not going to along with us, so we need to find a variation of this theme so we can move these four or five, whatever they were, off this complete recalcitrance into at least not objecting." So he said, "You can't do it. I'll damn well go there and do it myself," and then he charges over there - which, of course, points out another difficulty of working with the OAS. If you always have your boss there, it made it difficult more for the ambassador than it did for a DCM, because while the OAS is the ambassador's turf and the Assistant Secretary should really, I suppose, have a sense of moderation in terms of dipping their toes into his turf, but it's kind of irresistible when it's only three blocks away. Anyway, so there he goes storming over there trying to read the riot act to these people and concludes it's not going to happen. But the ire that got provoked was very instructive and caused a lot of irritation in the State Department because it was so unusual that in dealings with the hemisphere people would say no, because by and large over the years people, countries have said yes to the United States. That we paid most of the bills probably helped it, but nonetheless I started out by saying how it does make for a certain imbalance when your paying 60 percent of the bill, but nonetheless there were several instances in which I can remember their saying "Absolutely not." And this spring on Peru, which has nothing to do with me because I gone but it was clear from the newspaper they just said no and the United States was very angry. [Inaudible.] Oh, yes, the election. Fujimori had 59 percent and he didn't want to postpone the run-off or whatever, so I guess we went in the lead trying to force a delay in a run-off election so that the contender, the other contender, could have fair access to the media and such and, you know, you couldn't get the rest of the Organization to go along.

Q: This was a time, both in the end of the Bush and the Clinton administrations, where there was a great deal of activity on the North American Free Trade Agreement and that stuff. I would have thought this would have stirred up concern with the rest of the OAS people by seeing...

HORSEY-BARR: It did.

Q: Here was a Northern American trade thing which is just going to...

HORSEY-BARR: Right, it did. And it particularly stirred up resentment on the part of the Caribbean missions who had long been promised that CBI legislation, Caribbean Based Initiative legislation, which, if I understand correctly, was to give tariff-free access on textiles and other finished products produced in the Caribbean. Well, that might have happened on that last six months. But anyway, the Caribbean nations felt very much that this promise to them had been made before the actual discussion began in earnest, and it caused a lot of resentment that we were proceeding with NAFTA. It was also a concern, I guess, in that Canada, probably as a very practical matter, often used the same people as the OAS for other sort of multilateral issues that were going on. For example, when the whole Summit of the Americas process started, Canada used the same people, whereas in the United States they were different. In the case of Mexico, the other leader, they sort of overlapped. That made it rather disjointed. For example, on NAFTA the mission, in effect the Latin American Bureau in the State Department, had very little to do with that until just the actual negotiations. It was all done by the Trade Representative's office, with, I suppose, clearances from State, but the real work was done by the Trade Representative's office. Now, State Department was very much involved in the lobbying thereafter to try and get passage of it, but not the actual negotiations. So the Summit said the details of NAFTA were not really in the OAS, and the only real follow-up work on NAFTA that was done by the OAS had to do with building a trade base, a data base on barriers to trade, which is a useful thing to do, of course, and is appreciated most by the countries that need it the most. NAFTA was not that big an issue in the OAS, as I say, for the most part intentionally by the United States.

Q: I guess it came a little later, but during your time were you involved in the fast track on Chile and bringing Chile into the...

HORSEY-BARR: No, again, that was a USTR (United States Trade Representative) thing. We would get some of the spillover because it surely was, and still is, a very active player in international scene, but we didn't actually do any negotiations. They still thought they might have a need for doing something at the OAS, but if they did, we were not the ones speaking. USTR had their person right there.

Q: Being in Washington did you ever find Congressional staffers and all fishing in troubled waters?

HORSEY-BARR: No, the Congressional folks did not fish in our waters. We would talk to the budget folks up on the Hill, but essentially we didn't have much interference. They looked on the OAS as place apart. Maybe what we should do or leave for the next time... You know, one of the things you said or I said reminded me that the OAS is sort of the linchpin of what's more broadly called the Inter-American System. Although I mentioned the political end of the OAS and the technical assistance and development end, there was also security apparatus, which is, of course, much weaker now than it was say during World War II. And there were various other bodies in the human rights' courts, which heard cases and actually ran their judgments involving financial consequences. So the Inter-American System, when one speaks of the OAS, oftentimes people mean the whole Inter-American System. Alternatively they might mean what is more specifically called the Permanent Council, which drives the political end of things, but what time is it; I have to go.

Q: Okay. We'll pick this up the next time. We've been talking about your time as DCM at OAS, and we'll pick up the broader area system, personnel, and some of the issues that we haven't touched on, I think particularly Cuba, Haiti, and Argentina sort of came back into the fold by this time and was...

HORSEY-BARR: Argentina was...

Q: Were there any sort of disputes between...

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, between countries.

Q: Ecuador and Peru, I guess.

HORSEY-BARR: That's right. Ecuador and Peru, that was ongoing, and Chile and Bolivia. But, you know, Chile and Bolivia was a war of words. The only fighting, military fighting, if you will, that was going on was between Ecuador and Peru.

Q: So we'll put those off for next time.

This is September 18, 2000. Sarah, before we get to specifics, what was your impression of how the OAS worked? You were there when to when?

HORSEY-BARR: I was there from April of '92 to July of '95, and then I was back there again from January of '97 to the summer of '98, I think it was.

Q: What was your impression of how it functioned?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, whether it functioned and how it functioned was very much a factor of who was there, because during the different periods when I was either working in the mission or otherwise closely associated with the OAS, I had the opportunity to see very good functioning and just abysmal functioning. For example, during the early '90s - I think we've already talked about - there was a cadre of excellent ambassadors from the key countries, the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Trinidad, Tobago, and that combination of people in conjunction with a very astute Secretary General who was not politically prominent - he was a career diplomat, a Brazilian diplomat - made it possible to do things, to get important decisions on democracy and civil-military relations done and accepted and then actually the beginnings of their implementation. At a later time there were much more prominent Secretary Generals, one the President of Colombia, and a collection of ambassadors who in their totality were not as able, so we saw a lot more public attention to the OAS but a lot less real action. As I consider and look back on it, it just seems to me that, like so many institutions, I suppose, it so depends on the capabilities and personalities of the people that are there.

Q: Okay. Maybe you can talk about, during the dates you were talking about, dealing with problems, whether it worked, didn't work, and why and so forth, in Cuba.

HORSEY-BARR: Well, Cuba, of course, since Castro has been a member but nonparticipating member of the OAS. It was suspended technically not because of its government but because of its export of revolution and that situation has continued to the present day. It's rather tenuous legally at this point, since, of course, Cuba didn't export any of its revolution anymore since the end of the Cold War. But nonetheless that's still a situation that's really active. From the United States' perspective, one of our great concerns was how to ward off any sort of concerted attack by significant players in terms of bringing Cuba back. That has been the whole U.S. approach.

Q: Our basic policy was just keep Cuba out, not looking at conduct or anything like that.

HORSEY-BARR: Well, it's kind of hard - you're right - it's kind of hard to look at conduct now, at least in terms of the conduct that led to its suspension, certainly doesn't apply anymore, because it's not exporting revolution anymore. So what the United States looked at is the same sort of issues that we talked about bilaterally with Cuba, the sort of structured economy, the human rights question, the totalitarian, if you will, form of government, but those are tenuous in terms of a defense in the OAS inter-American system, because while certainly the charter of the OAS talks about respect of human rights and participative democracy, in fact other governments have been members who have flouted these aspects.

Just go through the Latin and Central American states and you can subdivide the rest of the continent in different ways and come up with countries that fall into just about every one of the objections we have against Cuba today. So that was a great concern, because legally it's rather tenuous and politically, of course, the Western Hemisphere with Canada in the forefront believe as do Americans that the best way to effect change is wrap them in a shroud of isolation. During the time I was there, and I think the case is still true today, there certainly was no wavering in terms of what to do, what the position should be, on Cuba, and we had a number of difficult moments, mainly caused not by Cuba, who seems to be quite happy with the situation, but caused by accomplishing other issues that made countries sort of coalesce together in opposition to the United States, and so Cuba was sort of a handy other issue for them to get started on. But the day will come, probably before we have changed our policy the way things are going, where it will be a more serious threat for the OAS from the perspective of bilateral policy.

Q: What does it take to make membership?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, it's non-functioning membership because Cuba is a member. In fact, if you look at the flags of the OAS whenever they fly the flags, the Cuban flag is there. They are a member. The whole quota system is based upon if Cuba were paying, so there's always that small percentage that had never paid because Cuba had been suspended, so they don't pay nor do they get any benefits. So they are a member, they are listed, their flag is flown, they have no seat at the table, although I kind of wonder whether that's a political statement or practical issue, because there simply isn't room with all the new states that came in the '70s and the table in the room has never been changed. You kind of wonder what you get. We had dealt with the Cuba issue, the United States had dealt with it, both on a political level as discussed earlier and on a practical level. I can't remember the name of the amendment, but there is an amendment that's been appropriated, this longstanding appropriation, legislation which says that - I think it applies to all international organizations because of course I can't see how it would apply to the United Nations, but it does apply to the Inter-American System - if any of the OAS money, Inter-American System money, goes to Cuba, that much doubled if subtracted from what the United States will pay to the Organization. So we dealt with the Cuba issue on sort of two levels, if you will, at the OAS.

Q: When you were there, were you all individually or collectively tweaked by the other countries by saying, "Why are you doing this?"

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, we were tweaked, we were tweaked publicly. People would make references to Cuba in their various speeches in appropriate sort of contexts from their perspective. It would be done publicly in the form of sessions. It would also be privately. But I think most people recognize that the locus of US-Cuba policy making was not in relation to the OAS. Much like when I was doing Ireland work, the desk, the Bureau was not the Ireland policy, US-Ireland or US-Northern Ireland policy. No, that was in the White House, because it was going to have a domestic constituency. I think the people, the foreigners in the OAS realizes that the same thing is true. It's still the policy. There wasn't anything we could do about. So they could rattle our cages privately, and what could we say, and publicly they could go so far but they didn't go that far, because they did not want to alienate the United States. This is where we get back to the imbalance in the American system between the United States and everybody else, both on a political and a very pragmatic level. They would never mess with the money aspect of Cuba business in the Inter-American System because they just knew. They rant and rave and about how we're paying our quotas as we have heard the last few years at the UN, but in the end it wasn't going to make any difference. We were not going to pay the money, so they never strayed from the prohibition about directing resources towards Cuba. I can't remember exactly. There were some rather tense moments. I can't remember why or how they came up, but one of those is what forms the basis for my statement that our position in terms of the OAS and Cuba is rather tenuous.

Q: Within your delegation and maybe within the OAS, if expressed, if Cuba were readmitted into full participation it might not be just so many but it might be the U.S. saying "Go your way."

HORSEY-BARR: I don't know. I don't know why we would ever do that. The trouble with the Inter-American System, unlike the UN or somewhat unlike the UN, it's so much more, it seems to me, dependent on the personalities, the personages if you will, who are there and everybody realizes that. If you look at the history of the OAS, it has had significant periods when it really didn't count for anything. Some people say we're in a period like that right now. Part of what makes such a period is the United States was turning its back, either consciously or in terms of a positive action or just by ignoring, which I think is more what people think is happening now. That affects the ability of the Organization to function. It's of critical importance to not have that happen if the Organization's going to function. So the idea that countries would ever tweak us that badly that they would consciously send the United States into a period of ignoring or disdaining the OAS, I think would be further than any of them would want to go, even though at the same time I would say that one often wonders, I wonder, about the reputation of the OAS and the Inter-American System in the minds of foreign governments because oftentimes if one considers the quality of ambassadors they send to Washington, the quality of representatives in the defense board and the other, they call them, specialized entities that they have on education or in other more technical fields, one says, "Well, that country really doesn't care much about the Inter-American System or they would have people with better qualifications and better access to the people in power and such," and so that sort of seems to say that they don't care about the Inter-American System. Nonetheless I can't see the Western Hemisphere pushing the United States that hard where they would run the risk of us just abandoning the OAS. And I think that makes sense from their political perspective. One of the things I never could understand all the years I was associated with it is why, because of the asymmetry, why other countries didn't try their damndest to build up the system more. It's sort of like Gulliver. If you have this giant you try and hamstring him, if you will, with all kinds of little strings and commitments and what have you, as opposed to minimizing the number of strings that were tying the giant to the ground and therefore leaving the giant more operational to be able to do what the giant, the United States wanted to on its own. I never understood this lack of depth of understanding of the Hemisphere, but I never could figure it out because it seemed contrary to the other countries' influence to not have this multilateral hemisphere system as strong as possible because that is continuing influence.

Q: Could we draw differences between various elements of the Hemisphere- were some more interested than others?

HORSEY-BARR: Different parts were interested in different things at different times. For example, the Caribbean came into the OAS, I mean with one or two exceptions, most of them became independent in the middle to late 70's, and so they joined the OAS at that point. At the time they entered the OAS Inter-American System they didn't feel that they needed the political support in terms of democracy, human rights, sovereignty and such as the Latins might have felt. They didn't ascribe to those concepts even for the Latins because they looked at it fairly much as a charade, sort of words that would be mouthed, and then as one looked at the concrete evolution of events in the Latin countries, there was nothing to bear out that attitude. What they wanted from the Inter-American System was money, and during the '70s and most of the '80s there were significant amounts of money that went to the small countries, not just the Caribbean but since we're speaking about them, great amounts of money in specialized technical fields, education, science and technology, the arts, preservation of some of their cultural heritage, and some for general economic development. And that was their primary concern easily for 20-25 years after they joined the Inter-American System. They tolerated the rest. They didn't have powers. They weren't in the forefront. In the late '90s it changed only because of their realization that monies had drawn back significantly, and they made a link to some of the smaller countries that are now gone between security and development and started on a political level arguing for things that had to do with their process of security, the climate change issue, other environmental-type issues, terrorism, and the narcotics business. And that reflects the age and the fact that the amount of money they get out of Inter-American System now is not terribly significant even for their small economy. The representation of the Central Americans is a little bit different. They were, of course, independent and part of the founding group of the OAS in 1948. They had not played a very prominent role and had pushed their own agenda primarily only since the beginning of the '90s at the end of the Central American conflict when they basically all had democratically elected presidents, were trying to show that this was a zone of peace and therefore again worthy of resources and making political points about peaceful resolution of disputes. The Latin and the South Americans from Panama down South. Mexico's a different place, so we'll leave that aside for now. The South American countries, I think, have always looked at the OAS... Like so many of pronouncements, I am really very much persuaded by the arguments that the former AID person, whose name is - I can't remember right now. He has written several books, the name will come to me. The thesis is development is the function of culture more than resources, and it relates to the South American countries, as I see it, in that the culture in those countries is very much.... If I say something is then it is, I don't have to do anything about it, just putting it out on the table makes it a reality as opposed to, I think, an Anglo-Saxon approach which is, of course, shared by the Caribbeans and Canada in the Inter-American System, as you put something out on the table and it is an aspiration or it is a commitment of future action. It isn't necessarily a reality. I think the OAS was so into that sort of cultural pattern as many South American countries, because the aspirations, if you will, the commitments that were put on the table in 1948, the birth of the modern OAS, certainly is not borne out by actions for many, many years, until the last 10-15 years. So what the relationship is between that state of affairs and the kind of people that were sent to the system, I don't know. The money certainly was insignificant from the perspective of the size of their economy. Politically I don't know that there is that much out of there, again because of the size and complexity of their countries, that what was going on at the OAS was, I have to say, relatively meaningless. There was a side show and we have to remember that the OAS, birth of the OAS, came in 1948, and that followed a significant period of hemispheric solidarity the way Inter-American System worked during World War II. During World War II in 1942 at the signing of the Rio Treaty - an attack against one is an attack against all, as it were - this was all directed to what was going on in other parts of the world. When you have euphoria after it is all said and done and you have this political system set up and agreed to in 1948, think it was fairly distant from reality, but there was euphoric high and the distance between what people hoped for in the early '40s and what happened, I think, has been very great, and we're trying to come together. We're in fact making great strides. I really think the early '90s was considered a high point of the OAS.

Q: You have really democratic rules seemed to be on the march.

HORSEY-BARR: It was on the march, but people are questioning right now whether it was going to live much less if it's marching anywhere. Of course, that gets reflected in the OAS. The more uncertainty there is in significant countries in the OAS, the less the organization, because that's the country - we can't forget that - is going to be able to do it. And I think that is explained why in the last four or five years, the Organization has not been able to do that much. It explains the behavior earlier this year of Peru, and the more countries that feel unsettled about their own internal democracy, it's less likely that they are going to want to connect themselves vis-à-vis one of their own because they may be next. So it's difficult. But, you know, one thing that we haven't spoken about that much is the Inter-American system at large. We have spoken about the OAS and we had spoken primarily of political issues, and so in that sense it's fitting that we've been talking about the OAS, but the web of hemispheric relationships in fact extends far beyond the political arena and, I would say, on the whole probably more successfully in the less political, more technical areas. Now, in the science and technology liaison and the education liaison - and they each have their sort of home body system - I think examples of hemispheric unity can really benefit all of them. The exchange of experiences between different levels at different times had developed, development in undeveloped countries, all particular issues, where politics or international or bilateral or multilateral relationships were essentially put aside. It was the technical people working together or the Department of Education working on education matters. I think those areas have been very successful. On the defense and political/military relations, again here you see both situations exist, the success and then the lack thereof, in terms of the Inter- American defense board and the security arrangements in the hemisphere. From a high in the 40's because of World War II and because of the Cold War to a large extent, although then as the Cold War evolved, the hemisphere sort of started splitting in terms of support. And when that started happening, it started falling by the wayside, and now what we have is that the shells remain without much substance. One of the things that went on for years and almost a decade or so, is what to do about the hemispheric security institutions. What's the threat, are these proper tools to deal with this threat, and so on. They haven't made much progress. So that falls between, if you will, the technical and then the political side, in terms of having once been a very useful instrument, and now just being a shell waiting.

Q: Okay, as of many of these organizations, they can fall into disuse, but all of a sudden they're damn handy to have around.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, exactly. So that's why people aren't doing anything. One could kill, and there have been numerous to do so, particularly since many of the later entrants to the system never saw security in military terms as did the original crew, such as the Caribbean and Canada, therefore never joined the security institution so you have a rather nominal situation where it's called the inter-American Defense Board but it is not really inter-American because there are like 12 or 13 countries, as I just mentioned, that aren't members and have no interest in being members.

Q: What's the lack of interest?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, historically part of it has to do with the fact that until three or four years ago you had to have a military representative there. So they were effectively excluded. They changed that four years or five years ago but at the same time in what has become even more prominent now is the fact of what is the point, and most of these countries are so poor that even for the OAS they may have two people, so they're not about to squander resources on something that they see just as needing someone. Why should they bother?

Q: They just need someone to supply the troops.

HORSEY-BARR: It is, yes, and they don't anticipate needing it anyway, and that is part of the problem. It was formed for extra-hemispheric aggression, to guard against it. Where's the threat against the hemisphere coming from? In terms of a military threat, there really isn't one. Then is the inter-American defense board going to take on environment security and what's the role of the military, should you define one of your security concerns as environmental security, and what's the military going to do about that? Of course, we have the same debate in this country, and the military does have significant other purposes more significant than environmental. In the case of Canada, while certainly they had a military, although this law was changed before Canada joined the OAS, which was only in 1990 or 1991, they just consider it a waste of time and money, and so they're actually in the forefront of people or countries saying, "Let's stay out. What are we going to do at this point?" It's not big bucks in your budget terms, but still just relatively small, a couple million dollars.

Q: Of course, if you're looking at it from our perspective it is not a bad idea to have military people at all these places talking to each other so that it makes it more likely to not go off on your own.

HORSEY-BARR: Well, I suppose there's something to that, but again you get into who's sent by which government to the Inter-American Defense Board. And historically it has been the case where the finest and the brightest were not sent; get the coup leader out of town. And oftentimes military officers in disgrace were sent off as ambassadors of that country to another Latin American or European country to get them out of Dallas, and the same thing is true in the OAS, so you get your undesirables out of Dallas and you put them somewhere where it doesn't really matter. So here you have the chicken and the egg, the Inter-American Defense Board and the supplies to the civilian post at the OAS too are less than the most competent, best placed if you will, people, best viewed people, placed at the Defense Board and at the OAS because those institutions are not highly regarded. Which comes first and how do you correct that, and where's the motivation? Back in the early '90s, for whatever reason - and I have spent a lot of time thinking about why it is, whether it was just happenstance or whether something had really happened in the hemisphere to get this critical mass of really great ambassadors at the OAS. We never had a critical mass of really good defense folks at the Defense Board, and those country representatives, military country representatives, on the military side oftentimes, frequently, most often don't even talk to their ambassadors, so in terms of civil- military relations, getting this link-up in terms of issues if you will, getting the military to focus, the hemispheric body of military guys, to focus on something's that important to their now all democratically elected presidents is, I assume, unattainable - let's just put it that way - for the moment, and I don't see anything changing there in the near term, because I don't see any country that has a need that the board could potentially address, therefore, I don't see the leverage, and some one country or couple of countries have got to see a need strong enough to get things moving, and I don't see it happening, certainly the United states doesn't have one.

Q: Let's talk about Haiti. Haiti was a brain issue in the Clinton-Bush campaign of '92, so when Clinton came on board. This was in many ways almost his fist major foreign policy test.

HORSEY-BARR: There was a coup in 1991 in Haiti. The wave of boat people exodus of refugees by boats, which most often are not boats at all but rafts of some sort, from Haiti seeking haven in the United States shot up dramatically, and that's why it was a campaign issue, that's why it was one of the first, if not the first, foreign policy issue that Clinton had to deal with. The OAS had again that same collection of stars that I had spoke of was at the OAS in '91. They had passed the year before at the highest level of the Foreign Ministry a resolution talking about the democracy being an indispensable part of membership in the OAS, which is nothing new from the charter but it took it several steps further setting a new direction to democracy with grounds for hemispheric action. So this came on the heels of that. That passed in 1990. The coup, if I remember, was in October of '91, and so, a couple of months, the election was not until '92. The election was 1992, so by '92 the OAS after a couple of months been spinning around and trying various high-level missions to areas of Haiti to get the situation reversed, much of the problem in the United States, decided that it would take hemispheric action. They decided to start ratcheting up actions against Haiti in the hopes of reversing and getting the coup guys out quickly. That did work, and so what we saw over the next two or three years, via constant pressure from the United States because of the domestic implication, was a continual ratcheting up of the screws, if you will, tightening the isolation of the leadership in Haiti, and that culminated in 1993 with the imposition of an embargo. If you look at the inter-America behavior of the countries as a group in that process, one has to remember again that, unlike the United Nations where General Assembly decisions were a majority can decide and issue, the OAS works by consensus in the very rare event that the final product, the final decision, is not signed onto by all, and that makes its strength and its weakness. In the case of Haiti the criticism was that what the OAS kept on coming out with what was weaker than what was desirable, but the strength of it at the same time was that, because everybody had signed onto it, everybody, every country, in the hemisphere was prepared to support it, so there was less sort of lip service and more real attention paid to what was agreed to. It didn't stop the exodus of people.

Q: OAS sent these people down there and talking to the junta?

HORSEY-BARR: Oh, yes. They were trying on a political level. They were trying to do that sort of thing, high-level missions, not just by the OAS Secretary General but probably more importantly by groups of foreign ministers going down and speaking to them on behalf of the rest of the countries, but the impact was negligible. The embargo people argue even today about the effectiveness of the embargo. I think perhaps the greatest achievement of the embargo was the fact that it permitted the UN to act, and that then having the UN involved in support of the OAS was not only a boost to the OAS, if you will, in that whole Haiti operation, but gave the cover, if you will, or the opening for the United States to go in militarily.

Q: What really were you getting from those who went to Haiti about the junta in Haiti? Were these people blind or were they cunning or...

HORSEY-BARR: I don't think they were blind. They knew exactly what they were doing. I think they were extraordinarily cunning, and, very prejudiced now, I'd say that I think they probably epitomize the worst of what you see in many Latin societies, maybe other places as well too but I don't know, that in sort of the absence of any civic mindedness. It was everyone's out for themselves. I don't think they were different from the previous rulers. One subsequent one in manifesting that sort of cultural trait, but I think the means that they used to effect their personal gains were much more vicious certainly than since and probably than before. I think by comparison with the situation now, that might have been a cumulative effect, so after living with the two Duvaliers, Papa Doc and Baby Doc, and having real attention focused on Haiti. You know more about the atrocities of the junta. We hear about them and we heard about them after we had heard about the atrocities of the Duvaliers. They may not have been that much worse but certainly more of the public perception of them was that it was an entirely different order than before. But the OAS tried to send in a human rights monitoring team. If I remember correctly, they did send it in, and that was the only sort of foreign presence. Most other governments left Haiti during the embargo, both for political and practical reasons. It was tough. And the OAS mission monitoring human rights was a very useful source of information and political pressure, but ultimately what changed the situation was the U.S. military intervention. People wondered about that at the time.

Q: The American military, you say. When we put the troops in, what was their immediate reaction at the OAS - oh my God, there go the Americans again, or thank God there go the Americans?

HORSEY-BARR: I would say both. Fortunately for the United States, the UN cover made it a non-OAS issue officially because they were going out under UN auspices, not OAS. I think the world, this hemisphere, was tired of Haiti, and Haiti fatigue continued even after that, but I think the Haiti fatigue attenuated everybody's interests. So on the part of the Latins, all right, fine, that's great; they went in and they removed an eyesore, and that's terrific. On the Caribbean side, the Haiti situation affected the Caribbean states much more directly than it affected the Latins just because of proximity. What is not talked about is how many refugees they got and what it did to their economic situation, the other Caribbean countries that were close to Haiti, and what the embargo did to them. So I think there was a bit of happiness that we had done it for them. It was tempered somewhat by the fact it was perfectly obvious that Peru, which was in a similar kind of situation - similar but not identical, of course - was being treated differently by the international system. So I think there was really a mix on the US intervention in Haiti on the part of the hemisphere. What happened in the years thereafter or what didn't happen in the years thereafter has also lacked in experience. What was the point? And yet, political situations don't run themselves generally into a nice and tidy solution.

Q: Moving on to Ecuador or Peru, business, we were near agreement about 1941 or something, also Brazil and somebody else...

HORSEY-BARR: Argentina.

Q: ...Argentina of the border. It flared up again, didn't it?

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, I don't remember why. I don't think I was at the OAS when it flared up. I can't remember why. I have a feeling it was a question of oil.

Q: It was a question.... It's always been a problem, but I think oil was found.

HORSEY-BARR: Oil was found, yes, and I can't remember though probably on the Ecuadorian side. The border is far longer than where this oil discovery was as I recall, and goes through some of the wildest country in South America that had never really been mapped properly, which was, I think, at the core of the problem, because while it had been this - I think you're right - 1941 agreement that we with three others guaranteed, if you will, guarantee the borders. It had very questionable border demarcation in it. For example, there was one part that went on the watershed of a series of mountains, but the question of what was the watershed had never been resolved. I can remember people just poring over these maps. I mean it seems rather absurd, I mean you're a diplomat and everybody sitting there. Now, who's map do you have? And everybody was figuring out what map are you going to use, and what map you use obviously started off from a different vantage point. It was an interesting exercise in diplomacy. The Ecuadorians kept trying to push this issue into the larger OAS, and that was a very interesting play in terms of the inter-American system where the smaller the country the more benefit accrues to them by the larger, if you will, multilateral studies. The Ecuadorians kept trying to push their position that the guarantor's business did not apply to this and the entire OAS should be involved in the issue. The United States was opposed; Peru was too and ended up staying with the guarantors. Another interesting aspect of that particular problem was the imbalance between Ecuador and Peru on all levels, economically, militarily, politically. Peru, of course, had Fujimori at the helm at that point, and Ecuador had a series of presidents, which made them rather weak in terms of the continuity issue if not the personalities of their presidents. It was a non-typical OAS issue in terms of the seriousness of the issue, the dispute, the different kinds of manifestations it had taken over years and years and years of tension between the countries and the fact that it periodically did erupt into armed conflict. The solution, of course, the immediate solution, which got it out of the OAS and therefore permitted its resolution was to enlist some high-level negotiator to work between the two countries outside of the system completely. And I think that speaks to the weakness of the OAS - unless one were to consider that this whole process of the negotiator having been sort of part of the Inter-American System. I suppose you can make that argument.

Q: Well, you can say that it was an organization, which sort of led a certain... And said, "Here, you do this and we'll back away."

HORSEY-BARR: In fact what went into that happening politically and in terms of public relations is that the OAS turned it over to special negotiation process, and at that point it became a bilateral thing. So the OAS was not the one that resolved it.

Q: Were there people there at the OAS who were activists in general or were members of the OAS sort of happy you could find somebody else to take care of matters?

HORSEY-BARR: I think the latter. First of all, I don't think most of the OAS cared about the question, thought it was relatively ridiculous, but sympathized with the plight of Ecuador, which is much smaller and was fighting the colossus of Peru, and was on the whole quite happy to get rid of it. It goes back to the people who are representing the countries at the OAS. I don't think most of the folks at the OAS were interested in tackling such a serious issue or had the wherewithal personally to deal with this, much less for the government. So I think everybody was quite happy, and ultimately I think the solution was fine for both countries. I think it was truly one of these good diplomatic solutions, which was arrived at the ultimate resolution of the conflict.

Q: While you were there, as of yesterday or the day before yesterday, Fujimori has sort of been an advocate more or less, but how was Fujimori, the President of Peru, seated in the OAS during the time you were there?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, the OAS witnessed his coming to power and then his sort of reincursion and skirmishes with going over the line of democracy, as the OAS saw it. I think in the beginning, in the early '90s before Fujimori started playing around with democratic foundations in Peru, I think the OAS members looked up to him as sort of the wave of the future, the first of these popular democrats, and gave meaning to the idea of new democracy by and for the people as opposed to democracy just representative of a new forum for old elite. I think that, because of that in part, the treatment of Fujimori was much more delicate than it would have been had it been a Caribbean country that we're talking about in terms of his actions, and that led to some divisiveness between the various groups in the OAS. I think the respect for what he was able to do in Peru in a non-democratic nation with the terrorism and the narcotics was undeniable. I forget to mention a more technical or less political institutions including organizations such as the Human Rights Commission and the Human Rights Court to separate other inter-American entities. The Human Rights Commission was very hard on Fujimori throughout this period, and most countries agreed with the Human Rights Commission reports, and that caused a certain amount of isolation of Peru in the OAS.

Q: How did the Peruvian ambassador operate under those circumstances?

HORSEY-BARR: [Inaudible.] She was a woman, a woman who had personal contacts with Fujimori, was not a career diplomat extremely effective, very smart and very charming - and, of course, charming is an extremely effective tool in many more male societies, Latin societies in the OAS, and it certainly was one of her great strength. And she was just resolute about getting her way. She was an extremely able, effective spokesperson for Fujimori.

Q: Did the United States take a particular stand on Fujimori, or were they king of going along with everyone else?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, I think in the beginning we were taking a stand on Fujimori and in the beginning the rest of the hemisphere were quite willing to be counted. I'd say the hypocrisy that the Caribbean countries accused the OAS of applied to the United States as well. It may be racially based, as was often the accusation; it may not. It stems from a very practical consideration: for example, isolating Haiti. If you look at the map, it's a fairly easy job compared to isolating Peru when you look at how many countries it borders if you were going to do an embargo. Many people said, "Well, why don't we do an embargo against Peru?" Well, it's just not very practical, quite apart from whatever political or racial prejudice were there. It affects big neighbors, Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile. How do you mount a blockade, an embargo, when you have so many countries with so many borders? That really would require active participation by all those countries to control their borders with Peru. I would venture to say that most of those countries probably don't even know exactly where the borders are. Most of those borders fall in jungle areas, so it's very, very difficult from a practical perspective. The other thing too is on a political level in Peru, Fujimori, was doing some good things. The fact that while he was taking these extra-constitutional, undemocratic actions, the fact is he was having success in controlling the terrorist operation, the Shining Path, and he was having success, and he did over a long period of time, success on the narcotics front is the extent to which it's now rampant in Colombia and not Peru. So the United States that sort of two against one, if you will, in terms of the balance of interest with Fujimori

Q: What about Chile and Bolivia? Did that cause any particular problem?

HORSEY-BARR: Oh, yes. Chile-Bolivia is an annual statement about the access to the sea. The statements they have, I believe, that these are serious, compelling issues to both countries, but when it's just sort of a once-a-year operation, one has to wonder whether they haven't decided to live with the status quo.

Q: The War of 100 Years.

HORSEY-BARR: Exactly. These conflicts between Guatemala and Belize were solved in the early '90s, so that was not much of an issue when I was at the OAS. In the '80s, of course, the whole Central America thing for better or for worse, so that OAS was helpful in the resolution of the border disputes between El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua on the Pacific side of the isthmus. Really the only military conflict that was significant was the one between Ecuador and Peru.

Q: That was really a battle of outposts.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, and without the nuclear threat that the outposts that are in India.

Q: Was there a feeling of almost self satisfaction within the OAS at this time? Before most of Latin America was run by military or quasi-military dictatorships, and all of a sudden you had a pretty democratic period.

HORSEY-BARR: The early '90s and mid-'90s were a period of self satisfaction for the OAS. I mean they were all democracies at least in terms of the election of their presidents. Their economies were doing very well, very well, which supported the whole concept or notion that the move to democracy had been a good thing. Their efforts hemispherically in the field were very well regarded. The human rights mission in Haiti with the UN was highly regarded. The demobilization that they did of armed combatants in Central America had been highly regarded, again part of that not in conjunction with the United States. They had set up a sort of reintroduction of military folks into civilian life in Nicaragua, and again that was highly regarded. They had done a peace process in Surinam. They had done many things in different fields, primarily political and political-military, which caused great satisfaction but very little public attention. One of the soul-searchings that went on regularly was how can we do such good things and nobody knows and nobody cares. Never mind. They did very good things. And then I thought all began to sort of wane, and I don't know why. I think they need a little more time to see whether it really waned or it's still alive, but the second half of the '90s seemed to have a waning of the effectiveness and the impact perhaps. Certainly the Human Rights Commission continues to be a very effective and attendant arm. Countries are not supporting it. The Inter-American System was depleting funds. The level of representation seemed to be lower. Perhaps it had to do with some democracy issues. The economy started to stagnate in the late '90s, and I gather that's getting fairly serious now, and maybe that combined with the popular authoritarian leaders. These people need to fix things at home before they can go elsewhere.

Q: One place we haven't mentioned during this time is Colombia as it slipped more and more under the control of the drug lords. Was that a concern to us?

HORSEY-BARR: No. They were a concern to us, yes, but was it voices of real concern in the OAS; was anything special done? No. Maybe that's true in two years or three years but not while I was involved with the OAS, no. Yes, Colombia would want a resolution to put in when they were talking about security issues, the threat of narco-trafficking. So there was all this verbiage.

Q: Did you get involved at all in the sort of the nuts and bolts of having the OAS in the United States: the Ecuadorian diplomat runs off with somebody's daughter, that sort of thing?

HORSEY-BARR: No, those all fell to me as DCM.

Q: You couldn't pass that off to the State Department?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, we worked very closely with a number of officers in the State Department Protocol Office, and the number two there in the Protocol Office was one I dealt with most often, Maria Johnson. I can't recall ever dealing with the police. I think normally the political people dealt with the police, because while the staff of the OAS was controlled by us, they were all beyond reproach as an international organization. Then, of course the missions were credited to the OAS and so the OAS Protocol people would deal through the mission with its political people. It was an interesting situation. I mean one part, knowing from my particular vantage point how many of the people at the OAS in fact were permanent residents and therefore didn't have diplomatic immunity, if not US citizens. Of course, it wasn't in their interest financially to be US citizens, and watching the shenanigans of people retired and tried to show up with these million-dollar retirement accounts, that they accumulated from being in a tax free status, retiring and not wanting to go back to country A, B, C, but rather wanting to have their retirement years here and still shelter their retirement income. It was quite amazing. From the perspective of being the host country of the OAS and seeing these very practical situations, problems, and having to resolve those, it was always interesting to me the vociferousness of anti-US feeling. Criticism of US was so loud and yet, of course, nobody ever wanted to go home, the diplomats, this euphoria. The international civil servants in the Inter-American System that were based here didn't want to go and be assigned, rotated, to Bolivia or Santiago or whatever. They were quite happy living here, and that became a real issue because part of the reason for the rather high pay was the idea that they could be sent by the Secretary General to any country in the hemisphere. Well, of course, none of them wanted to do that. They wanted to live in the United States with their high salary and tax-free status, and yet at the same time their country representatives would be sitting there in the various political or technical forums criticizing the United States. It's always a very interesting sort of contrast. Another interest of mine is the number of - it's a lot; I think there's five or six - Cubans in the US who came after the ascent of Castro and essentially sought refuge here and have been diplomats, including one who is so elderly now but who was the Cuban ambassador in Colombia when Castro was there in 1948 leading demonstrations against the OAS before he ever came to power.

Q: That was the Bogotá¹/₂ uprising of April 9, 1948 and the assassination of Gaitan.

HORSEY-BARR: Exactly, and he was spirited out of Colombia by the Cuban ambassador and back to Cuba, and that Cuban ambassador is now still serving at the OAS. There are very interesting historical things from that one mundane job of dealing with the fact that we're the host country for many of these.

Q: There's a hiatus between '95 and '97. What were you up to?

HORSEY-BARR: I went off to senior seminar from September to June. Of course, many people criticize or praise that depending. I think it has mixed value. I certainly enjoyed my time, but I question the value overall for the State Department. But we had two high points of the year. One was the trip to Alaska, which awoke in me an interest in environmental issues and a connection with political questions, and in fact led to my next assignment. The second issue, since I spent so much time in the southern United States was the whole budget debate. Remember that was the year the budget shut down, federal budget shut down, in the government and such, and the debate over federalism and just what the relative bounds of power between the states and the federal government should be, which was interesting just as sort of a student of the United States and not having didn't pay much attention. But the environment issues we start off on as a country but refer to the states for conservation, if you will, and the need for development on a local or regional level. That got me very interested in environmental issues, and I went back to work at OAS taking up Secretary Christopher's initiative to integrate environmental issues with more traditional foreign policy issues.

Q: You did that from when to when?

HORSEY-BARR: I did that for about nine months from June of '96 to January '97, when I went back to the mission to the OAS.

Q: On the environmental side, how effective were we there? Was it hard to raise the consciousness of everyone?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, the State Department certainly. I was fascinated by that bureau because, unlike any of the others including Consular Affairs that I had knowledge of, its focus was so much away from the State Department to other agencies of the federal government and to the NGOs, non-governmental organizations, that it was an eye opener for me. Now, I think the State Department sort of coming along in terms of being more open to outside domestic players, but I had never experienced that. That bureau is just wide open to the world outside the State Department and rather closed relative to the world of the State Department. Many of the people in that bureau, most, are not Foreign Service Officers, and that is, of course, part of the problem from the perspective of what my job was. Most of them are civil servants; a lot of them are Ph.D.s in various scientific or medical fields, again quite unlike Foreign Service Officers. Many of them are on detail from other government agencies, technical, scientific, environmental agencies. Some are on detail from organizations, both non-governmental and private companies that are working in the field. There are all kinds of shared resources and arrangements that I had never heard about in other parts of the State Department. The purpose was obviously to get into this group of people, this function in the State Department, people that knew the issues from a technical/scientific perspective. What they hadn't done was get very many people in there that knew how to make things happen on a political level relative to their issues. So, yes, they were effective in the scientific community but they were not effective in the diplomatic community. One of Secretary Christopher's initiatives was to get the two to merge then so that the United States could be more effective politically around the world in dealing with these scientific/environmental issues. That was sort of a two-sided effort, the first part trying to convince people within the Bureau that there was value to dealing with regional bureaus. The other part, for example, was getting the regional bureaus to see that there was some value for them. I remember the greatest success that I had. It was a very discouraging at first; it went along slowly; and it was only before I left that I had my greatest satisfaction - I think it's continued since - with the European Bureau where the Baltic States and EUR's objective adjusted vis-à-vis the Baltic States because...

Q: You're talking Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania.

HORSEY-BARR: Exactly, exactly. Again, there wasn't much money to throw at all those issues that had come about because of the breakdown of the USSR establishment of these breakaway republics. The idea was that they wanted these countries to share experiences, to band together and help each other out. The United States will help a little, but they said that they could further their objective of getting these three or four countries to coalesce and to follow through. It would make the money go further and it would also provide a bulwark, if you will, against instability in Russia if these little countries were sort of united in terms of what they were doing. After many months of discussing this with them, they finally realized that they could use the nuclear pollution issue as one way of bringing together the countries and cementing their common interest, because they all has the same sort of problem in various degrees with all this military debris, if you will, that the Russians, the Soviets, had left behind and no resources with which to contain possible pollution and radiation from these countries. That was just at the very end. It was extremely satisfying when you actually saw the light bulb go off in these leaders in the European Bureau and they realized that this environmental issue, which US domestic agencies had been harping on, primarily EPA, for months, years, about the seriousness of the problem and the State Department had to take the lead to do something about it. It finally went off like, as I say, this light bulb that they could use this issue and the domestic agencies' interest in working on this issue and putting resources in it to further their own political objectives vis-à-vis that area. I suppose other things must have happened, but to me that was a prime breakthrough in great force, unlike most of my career where things just take so long that you're not there to sort of see the breakthrough and you might read about it later on and think about you had some small part in the outcome.

Q: What brought you back to the OAS?

HORSEY-BARR: Well, my successor died.

Q: Oh. Who was your successor?

HORSEY-BARR: Bill Taylor, a consular officer. He came back from Guatemala, where he had been DCM, in the summer of '95 and developed lung cancer after six months or a year and died in January of '97. So the ambassador called me up and said...

Q: Who was the ambassador?

HORSEY-BARR: The ambassador was Thomas Hadibaba, who had been ambassador when I left, and so asked me to come back because they were in the middle of some fairly technical negotiations that they hoped to conclude by the OAS' General Assembly date, which was always the first week of June. So I went back. I left my environmental job and went back there and stayed there for about a year and a half.

Then I went as executive director on detail, as executive director for Pan-American Development Foundation (PDF). One of the things, other than just serving in the usual sort of DCM capacity again, one of the things I did during that second stint in the mission was that I headed up the US follow-up to the Santa Cruz Summit that took place in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. This had been a meeting that was very important to the country and particularly Gore on the Clinton administration, particularly Gore. It had taken place in 1996, and I think was supposed to sort of undo the tarnished US image left over from the Rio Conference...

Q: This was on environmental matters.

HORSEY-BARR: Exactly, and so this was like a shine-up image, exactly, vis-à-vis at least the inter-American hemisphere. Gore took a personal interest in it because of his image of being an environmental guy, but the interesting thing about that was that I was sort of trying to coordinate the US effort vis-à-vis this thing and also heading up the OAS committee process that was trying to come up with hemispheric positions. The interesting thing about that was how little anybody cared - again, a lesson in the question of expediency on political levels, because areas that seemed so important back in 1996 when the actual conference was held, and here we were in '97 trying to do a follow-up which everybody called for in '96 and was now beginning in 1998, I guess it was, and nobody cared, including the United States. But everybody wanted to have this conference, at least on paper, they wanted to have this meeting to sort of assess what progress had been made.

Q: This was on environmental matters.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, environmental matters. I will just move on from there. So I went off on detail to Pan-American Development Foundation, which is associated with the OAS in that it receives a small annual subsidy, and its mission is to sort of do development work and carry out policies of the OAS as a non-government entity based in Washington. It has its board of directors as a private entity. For many years it had paid no attention to the OAS in any way except for taking its money, and now it's hard up for money as are many NGOs and so they wanted to pay more attention to the OAS and hopefully get some more money out of there. I guess it was not a very satisfactory arrangement. The main thing, I think, of significance in the hemisphere was the whole question of Hurricane Mitch and now we responded. As you know, that hurricane took place probably about October, September or October, of '98.

Q: It was horrible.

HORSEY-BARR: Horrible. The hurricane just sort of stopped over Honduras, the northern part of Nicaragua for four or five days. I was in Nicaragua at the beginning of the hurricane and fortunately was sick and so decided to get out, because when you're sick you don't want to be in a hotel room. But even then - that was the first day of the hurricane - the flights were being canceled. I had to go down to Panama in order to get back up to the United States. So I was very grateful that I had gotten out. It would have been maybe ten days because roads, airports were washed out and non-functioning at least for weeks and months thereafter. But at PDF it was an interesting vantage point from which to view hemispheric reaction. The OAS issued its usual pronouncement, typically wordy and absent of significance in terms of providing material. I suppose that's harsh, but the fact is there. At PDF we took a leadership role and were very successful in raising funds in the community here in Washington and then channeling those monies down. It offered an opportunity for the OAS to really get private sector funding in the US, and perhaps it will lead to that down the road, which might help in larger terms the development of the country, but that's a long way away.

Q: How did Panama Development get involved in Hurricane Mitch?

HORSEY-BARR: Oh, you mean PDF?

Q: Yes.

HORSEY-BARR: We had a couple of operations going already so we had contact, and we used the OAS offices in the region. One of our programs was getting used equipment, office equipment and hospital equipment, and refurbishing it and sending it to clinics in the region. That was a very successful program. We used the infrastructure for that program to collect household items, building supplies, used clothing, of course, which I think was of moderate utility, and sent containers to Honduras and Nicaragua with those items to help in the immediate aftermath and then help with the building, and we got local businesses in the DC and Baltimore area to finance cash or finance containers or finance building materials. We had radio-thons and I did radio interviews and callers would send checks. Again, it was a very unusual experience.

Q: Did you find that the Foundation was able to push the right buttons and act with a degree of promptness through the work.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, in terms of the immediate aftermath. Of course, the Foundation could not begin to touch the scale of what was needed. You mentioned the word 'promptness', and that was one of the great criticisms of the response to the hurricane with the length of time it took, not only in the immediate aftermath, immediate emergency assistance, but also in terms of the international community, the pace set by international financial institutions to review the situation and make loans, grants, whatever, available. The protests in Seattle at the WTO (World Trade Organization).

Q: This was in the year 2000.

HORSEY-BARR: Yes, but those sorts of issues - at the International Monetary Fund meeting this year in the spring, the same sort of protest about the lack of responsiveness to the needs of the developing world. The reaction to government and quasi-governmental responses after Hurricane Mitch was along the lines of what was heard around the United States about President Bush at those meetings. I'm certainly not an authority to know how one faces those problems of response time, because so much depends on the country's or somebody's assessment of need and identification, sort of breaking the need down into manageable chunks and putting it into the broader context.

Q: There are so many.

HORSEY-BARR: Right. What the solution was I don't know, but certainly what I did witness was the unhappiness of the hopeful civilians in both the quantity and the timeliness.

Q: Well, you left the PDF when?

HORSEY-BARR: I left in the summer of '99, and then I decided to retire and so retired at the end of November '99, and so there we are. I'm retired and happy.

Q: Excellent.

End of interview